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ABSTRACT
The Earl of Dartmouth was a gentle, good, amiable
man* Like all Englishmen of his day he was a Whig in that
he was a firm believer in Parliamentary supremacy! unlike
some, he saw no danger in this supremacy for the liberties
of America. He entered government because his stepbrother
needed support, and while he had some sound ideas on
colonial policy, he could not overcome the obstacles he
faced in putting them into effect. His ideas were out of
tune with those of the king and a majority of the cabinet,
and he lacked the political talent to make them prevail.
His office was not set up to give him full control over
American affairs or even to give him full and accurate in
format ion.
The Boston Tea Party horrified him as it did those in
opposition who had made their politics a war on Lord north’s
American policy. Before the tea party he had hoped to end
dissension between mother country and colonies by letting
contention subside and by separating the power of taxation
from the exercise of it? if the colonists would forbear
denying the former, Parliament would refrain from maintain
ing it by the latter. After the tea party he believed that
the colonists must be made to obey the laws of Parliament
or suffered to become independent. He didn’t mean to con
quer the Americans, but to create ”inconveniences” for them-"Inconveniences" not unlike those the colonies had caused
the mother country in 1765--which would bring them to a
sense of their duties and privileges as members of the
Empire. At the same time he hoped to quiet the unrest by
capturing the incendiaries. He did not agree to the lengths
his colleagues went, but he was with them in spirit if not
in degree! while he would have prevented the Administration
of Justice Act, The Quartering Act and parts of the Massa
chusetts Government Act, had it been in his power, it was
not and he was not so discomfited by them that he failed to
steer them through the House of Lords. If America would
once show submission to its laws, then Parliament could
repeal the Tea Duty and thus demonstrate that It could be
sovereign in name and not In deed.
When it become apparent that
succeeded in further exciting the
their liberties”, Dartmouth hoped
harmony by reminding its subjects
vi

these measures had only
colonists* "jealousy of
to restore the empire’s
that Britain’s resolution

to uphold its authority was tempered by benevolence, of
which the Conciliatory Proposition was to be evidence.
Behind the scenes he was seeking In every way he knew to
explore the areas of agreement between the two parties.
But he saw no inconsistency in continued firmness, which,
for practical reasons, he had to acquiesce in anyway.
When his three policies, non-aggravation, firmness
and benevolence, had obviously failed to achieve unity, his
belief in Parliamentary authority and love of empire com- n
biaed to convince him that force, with the ugly consequence
of civil war, was necessary. To make room for its execu
tion, he resigned his Seals, but unable to desert north,
he remained in government as Lord Privy Seal.

vli

CHAPTER I
THE AMIABIiE BGRD DARTMOUTH

11HA IXI

HAPPY DAYr'

It is customary, la a personality-oriented essay, to
begin with an introduction to the personality*

In the case

of William Xegge, the second Earl of Dartmouth, and an
essay examining the crucial years leading up to Britain’s
loss of her first Empire, this introduction is tantamount
to putting the denouement in the first chapter.

For it will

be evident, once the reader becomes acquainted with the
Earl, and certainly once he places him in his eighteenthcentury milieu, that Dartmouth was simply not constituted
to serve as saviour of the Empire, if indeed, any one
statesman could have saved it*
But this was not apparent when Dartmouth became Secre
tary of State for the Colonies in 1772, either to him, his
English admirers, or the American subjects so unhappy with
their imperial connection*

Dartmouth had warm feelings for

his "fellow subjects . . . who, notwithstanding their late
excesses, * . . possessed * . , sound and sober principles
n
of both religion and government."
He entertained high
2
hopes for a peaceful settlement of the difficulties and so
2

3

did the many friends who wrote to compliment him on his
3
appointment.
The King welcomed him to the Cabinet with
unusual ardor.

It augured well to have "so great and good

a man as lord Dartmouth’1^ take what had come to be a crucial
place in the administration.
the news had its most enthusiastic reception in
America.

There Dartmouth's accession was greeted with uni*

versal ley and thanksgiving.

From Boston, former slave

Phillis Wheatly summed up the prevailing mood in a congratu
latory poem that began;
Hail! Happy Bay! when smiling like the morn
Fair Freedom rose, Hew England to Adorn.6
Isaac Skillman, a Boston preacher, dedicated An Oration Upon
the Beauties of liberty, or the Essential Bights of
*7
A
Americans f to Dartmouth*
Benjamin Franklin, in London as
agent for several colonies, put aside a pamphlet he had
written on the dispute between Britain and America due to
”an expectation . . . from the good character of the noble
lord (Dartmouth), that the grievances of the colonies would
be . . . redressed," and wrote home of the "favourable
appearances arising from the change of our American minis t e r . A n o t h e r letter of Franklin's, this one anonymous,
appeared in the Fublick Advertiser;
But tho the Americans have been long
oppressed, let them not despair. The
administration of the colonies is no
longer in the hands of a Shelburne, a
Glare, or a Hillsborough; Thank Heaven
that department is HOW entrusted to an
EHGLISHMAB! Be it his glory to reverse
those baneful and pernicious measures
which have too long harrowed the

colonies, and have given such a
blow to the Credit, the Commerce
and the NAVAL BOWER of the mother
country.10
let far from effecting reconciliation, in less than
three years Dartmouth found himself charged with waging war
on his "fellow subjects".

In contrast to the sunburst of

expectation in which he entered office, his exit took place
amidst storm clouds of failure.
The purpose here is to resolve this paradox.

In

searching for clues
to such resolution we will study Dart*
)
mouth himself, his office, the political situation of his
day, and the years he served as American Secretary.
'ONE WHO WEARS A CORONET AND PRAXS*
The second Earl of Dartmouth was born William Legge
on June 20, 1T31, with all the privileges and expectations
of a member of the upper class.

His family was not wealthy

but their son inherited a sizable estate with houses at
St. James Square in London, Blackheath in Kenty Woodsome
in Xorkshire, and what was to be his favorite residence,
Sandwe11 in Staffordshire.

His father died when young

William was a little over a year old, so at his grandfather'
death in 1?50, Dartmouth came directly into his title and
11
estate.
When William was five his mother became the
second wife of Francis, the seventh baron North who after
wards became the first Earl of Guilford*

This marriage

proved to be as great an influence on the course of his
future life as his own birth for it united him with Guil
ford's family and after his mother's death, with that i

of his stepmother, Guilford’s third wife.

Guilford’s sod,

Frederick, was two years older than Dartmouth and the two
became devoted friends, growing up in the same household,
attending Oxford and taking the fashionable tour of the con*
11
tinent together.
The family circle was large and intimate,

Dartmouth

had two older sisters and a half brother and sister from his
mother’s second marriage as well as his stepbrother Frederick*
Guilford was a doting parent to each without distinction,
and the brothers and sisters Ignored their half and step
12
relationships as well.
Jonathan Swift had written of the first Earl that "my
Lord Dartmouth is a man of letters, full of good sense and
good nature, and honor) of strict virtue and regularity in
his life but labours under one great defect--that is he treats
his clerks with more civility and good manners than others
in his station have done the

The words could have

Queen.

been applied equally to his grandson.

He was generally

known as "the good Lord Dartmouth" and Richardson let it be
known soon after the appearance of his novel depicting the
good man, Sir Charles Grandlson, that the young earl might
have been the model for his bero.lif
character was not his only virtue.
good he is termed "amiable.

A moral and upright
As often as he is called

4 young Peggy Hutchinson

wrote enthusiastically to her sis ter*in-law soon after her
arrival in London in ITT**-*

"He is the most amiable man I

ever saw) and was he not married, and was he not a Lord, I

/him . ,
**^d he teatpted +

dowred kinswomen of
o ®.e/
12 ^^55 Da**.*
Catherine Nicholl. An old
hls st
ur
ePmoihe*^
new lady Dartmouth as "rather
F&mtly - .
/
-1^lena
civil" and, perhaps most significantP re ■£
>/
* • * e is . * ."
The marriage was long and
ly f*as *. /
®°<&hared an interest in religion and their
j. _

baPPy as

yen. The Historical Mannscripts Commission*®
®ine ej
A of his papers provides ample illustration of Dart««le/

concern for his immediate and larger families,
lasting many long letters dealing with such problems as his
9ons* education and his sister's marriage settlement.
/

Managing these affairs and overseeing his estates were a
large part of the private life he loved.
There were other activities of a personal nature that
kept Dartmouth busy in his private life, however*

His

stepmother introduced him not only to his wife but to the
Countess of Huntingdon, around whom an evangelical group
18
had grown up.
Not really dissenters, they were seeking
to reform the Anglican church from within, with emphasis on
personal and "methodical" piety.

Dartmouth was well ac

quainted with and well regarded by many of the Methodist
leaders, and at one time was considered as the logical
successor to Lady Huntingdon as leader of the circle. His
admiration for the serious godliness of the Puritans was one
of the strongest bonds of sympathy he felt for America.

So

7

universally known was the Bari’s religiosity, that in an
era of widespread latltudinarianism, characterized by vice
and evil on all layers of society,^ his ’goodness1 was
often ridiculed.

Horace Walpole once described him as "in

the odour of d e v o t i o n " a n d lord Hillsborough found him
unfit for office due to a surfeit of humanity and religion.

21

If some sneered# one of Dartmouth's greatest admirers on
this account, was the King*

George Ill’s religious ideas

were not too different from Dartmouth’s and he thought him
op
"a most excellent man."
Quite a few of his letters bear
testimony to the esteem in which he held the Earl2^

but

none is so poignant as the one he sent him when Worth’s
ministry fell,
To avow how very near he (Dartmouth) will
ever be to my heart, and that I have ever
esteemed him in another light than any of
his companions . . ♦ What days it has pleased
the Almighty to place me in when Lord
Dartmouth can be a man to be removed but at
his own request I But I cannot complain, X
adore the will of Providence, and will ever
resign obediently to His Will. My heart is
too full to add more. ^
It followed naturally for a man of Dartmouth’s beat to
have charitable and benevolent interests.
were of a religious sort?

Some of these

for example, his support of

John Hewton# a slaver who became a parson, and the Eleazar
Wheelock Indian Charity School, an American institution
designed to train Indian boys to preach the gospel to their
own people#

The latter benefitted so much from his time and

money that it was named Dartmouth College in his honor.

25

6
should be tempted to set my cap at him . , ,nJ‘
In 1755 Dartmouth married a well dowred kinswoman of
his stepmother. Miss Frances Catherine Wlcholl.

An old

family friend described the new Lady Dartmouth as "rather
pretty . . . cheerful, civil" and, perhaps most significantly, "as good as be is . *

17

The marriage was long and

happy as they shared an interest in religion and their
nine children,

fhe Historical Manuscripts Commission1®

calendar of his papers provides ample illustration of Dart
mouth's concern for his immediate and larger families,
listing many long letters dealing with such problems as his
sons* education and his sister's marriage settlement*
Managing these affairs and overseeing his estates were a
large part of the private life he loved.
Hhere were other activities of a personal nature that
kept Dartmouth busy in his private life, however.

His

stepmother introduced him not only to his wife but to the
Countess of Huntingdon, around whom an evangelical group
18
had grown up.
Hot really dissenters, they were seeking
to reform the Anglican church from within, with emphasis on
personal and "methodical" piety.

Dartmouth was well ac

quainted with and well regarded by many of the Methodist
leaders, and at one time was considered as the logical
successor to Lady Huntingdon as leader of the circle. His
admiration for the serious godliness of the Puritans was one
of the strongest bonds of sympathy he felt for America.

So

7

universally known was the Bari's religiosity, that in an
era of widespread latitudinarianism, characterized by vice
and evil on all layers of
often ridiculed*

society,

^

his 'goodness1 was

Horace Walpole once described him as "in

the odour of devotion" ^ and lord Hillsborough found him
unfit for office due to a surfeit of humanity and religion.

21

If some sneered# one of Dartmouth's greatest admirers on
this account, was the King*

George Ill's religious ideas

were not too different from Dartmouth's and he thought him
22
"a most excellent man."
Quite a few of his letters hear
testimony to the esteem in which he held the Barl^, fcUt
none is so poignant as the one he sent him when Worth's
ministry fell,
Ho avow how very near he (Dartmouth) will
ever he to my heart, and that I have ever
esteemed him in another light than any of
his companions . . *What days it has pleased
the Almighty to place me in when lord
Dartmouth can he a man to he removed hut at
his own request! But I cannot complain, I
adore the will of Providence, and will ever
resign obediently to His Will. My heart is
too full to add more.
It followed naturally

for a man of Dartmouth's heat to

have

charitable and benevolent interests.

were

of

Some of these

a religious sort: for example, his support of

John Hewton, a slaver who became a parson, and the BXeaaar
Wbeelock Indian Charity School, an American institution
designed to train Indian boys to preach the gospel to their
own people.

£he latter benefitted so much from his time and
25
money that it was named Dartmouth College in his honor.

8

Other philanthropies were cultural and artistic.

The

poet William Cowper and poet-essayist Dr* James Beattie
received financial aid as well as sympathy from Dartmouth
and the Bari sought to encourage a variety of artists by
26
buying or commissioning their work.
It was Cowper who
celebrated Dartmouth in his poem ’’Truth" as "one who wears
a coronet and prays."

His patron's concern for the poet's

well-being is seen in a score of letters in volume III of
the Historical Manuscripts Commission calendar of the
Dartmouth papers.
Thus his attachment to domestic life, religion, letters
and philanthropy combined to keep him from assuming any
public role.

He had taken his seat in the House of Lords

on May 31* 175^, upon his return from the continent; but
while he had spoken with the Newcastle Whigs on the Cider
Tax in 17^3 and in denouncing the pamphlet Droit le Bol in
176h, these were the only two times he had raised his voice
on an issue in ten years#

He was not interested in

politics.
A GENTLE MAN ENTERS GENTLEMAN’S POLITICS
Dartmouth was not interested in politics and he had
little aptitude for its combative atmosphere.

Possessed of

the integrity of a statesman, he lacked the shrewdness of
a Newcastle or the pugnacity of a Pitt.

In 1766 when it was

being considered whether his office would become a third

9

Secretary of State or continue as First Lord of Trade, his
friend the Earl of Chesterfield wrote him to "lay aside
upon this occasion your natural timidity and diffidence!
spur on your friends who wish you extremely well, 11

The

failure of Dartmouth to achieve the third secretaryship at
oR
this time had as much to do with Pitt*s disapprobation
as Dartmouth’s diffidence, but it is indicative of his na
ture that Chesterfield should write to him in such a vein*
In spite of the fact that Dartmouth had spent the
first years of his adult life engrossed in private matters,
he must have known that his background and station could
not allow him to avoid the responsibility of public busi
ness forever*

His grandfather had played an active role

on the political stage, serving in the House of Lords, on
the Board of Trade, as Secretary of State for the Southern
Department and as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal until the
death of Queen Anne *

Two of his uncles, Heneage Legge and

Henry Bilson Legge, had served as Baron and Chancellor of
29
the Exchequer, respectively.
It was the former who wrote
to him during his grand tour:
Hobody wishes your success and good figure
in the world more warmly than I do . * .
(Ju-Q 1 can’t help crying ‘Fire!1 when I
see any danger coming toward you* There is
a huge dose of flattery preparing for you
in high places, against your return to
England * , * . We have an excellent hand
at it in this country and if a young man of
Quality and fortune can count twenty when
he returns and does not absolutely pick
pockets, we all cry, ’Tertius caelo cecidit
Cato!* But I thank God y o u h a v e s e n s e
and spirit enough to take the substantial
benefit of a good character and not let the

10

flattery which will attend it turn you
[and North] into asses. 30
The young Earl apparently took this advice to heart.

From

his other uncle he acquired the political principles that
led him to align himself with the old Whigs centered around
the Duke of Newcastle in the House of Lords.

It was the

Duke who at length convinced Dartmouth to hear the call of
duty, forsake his own inclinations,
Ministry.

and join the Rockingham

The call from Newcastle must have been persuasive,

for he was a cousin to North and his wife was a cousin of
Dartmouth's.

Together the step brothers had visited him during

their tour while he was in attendance to George II in
Hanover.^

In the decade that had elapsed since that intimacy,

he had performed several favors of patronage for Dartmouth,
and the two had corresponded at length concerning the
last illness of Dartmouth's uncle, Henry Bilson Legge,
who was a friend of N e w c a s t l e ' s . ^

When he heard that

Dartmough had refused an invitation to join the new ministry
as either First Lord of Trade or in a position at the
Treasury, he wrote him that
I must do justice to us all that it was
essential in forming an administration that
would satisfy the nation, and be able to
carry on the business with credit and re pu 
tation, to have your Lordship in such rank
and station as should be most agreeable to
you.
Perhaps more telling in its
flattery

effect on Dartmouth than this

was his contention that:
The Duke of Grafton and my Lord Rockingham
are both about your Lordship's age, and if

11

they had not got the hotter of their
own inclination for the sake of the
King, and the Public* I don *t know where
the King would have got a Secretary of
State* or a freasury.3^
Dartmouth could no longer refuse and in July he Joined
Rockingham as head of the Board of Trade.
Eis entrance into active politics separated him from
Horih* who* after taking a seat in Commons in 1?5^ and being
appointed a Junior lord of the Treasury in IT 59> had been
cooperating with the Grenville administration*

Moreover*

in his only two speeches in Parliament Dartmouth had
taken an opposite stand from his stepbrother.^

neverthe

less* there does not seem to have been any alienation
between them* for Hewcastle wrote Dartmouth in the fall in
reference "to sound (i^sD

OXLT friend* my lord Worth*"

on an "honorable and advantageous offer*1’ apparently in an
attempt to get him to come over to the Whigs.3^

Dartmouth

was unable to obtain an affirmative reply* and it was not
many years before the making of offers was reversed and
Worth was attempting to persuade Dartmouth to accept an
ri4*Tnm
n tv «
p O 111
Oluw II

If Dartmouth was reluctant to enter the political
arena* once there* as was fitting for a man of his cons
cience* he took his new duties seriously.

He lacked experi

ence and sometimes enjoyed only a tenuous relationship to
the rest of the ministry*^ but these drawbacks did not
hinder his zeal.

He came into government in the midst of

the Stamp Act crisis and that affair demanded immediate
attention.

Rockingham's group had accepted the King's

invitation to take office even though they had no solution
for the conflict, and were undecided on what to do about
it for some months.

On the one hand was the appeal of

overturning an act of the Grenville Whigs, hut on the other
the hesitation to set a precedent that might impair the
power of Parliament.

As Bargar points out, no true Whig
38
could he expected to support an unconditional repeal,
which would impeach Parliamentary Supremacy.

The ministry

hedged until after Pitt had declared himself and the path
of practical politics became clear.
Dartmouth never questioned Parliamentary supremacy,
but he earnestly believed that this particular tax was
inexpedient^ and should therefore be abolished.

The non

importation agreements had created hardships in England and
the First lord of Trade declared in the House of Lords
that "not less than 50,000 men in this kingdom were at this
time ripe for rebellion for want of work, from the uneasy
situation in the colonies."^0

The solution to this quandary

of Parliamentary Integrity and colonial intransigenee lay
in repeal coupled with the Declaratory Act stating unequi
vocally Parliament's right to legislate for the colonies in
all cases whatsoever.

The strength of Dartmouth's belief

in the correctness of this course is revealed in a letter
to Rockingham urging him not to resign on its account:

13

The case is not yet desperate and while
there is the least shadow of hope of
doing good, I would on no account give
up the game to those who will, undoubtedly,
do mischief. The Act once repealed, I
shall heartily congratulate your Lordship
upon a release from your fatigue. Your
successors may then he left to enjoy the
sweets of an honorable coalition and hug
themselves in possession of employment,
which nothing but concern for the public
good can make it worth your while to
hold
Speaking for the bills in Lords, and securing proxies from
Huntingdon and Chesterfield, he helped secure the passage
he felt so vital.
BockIngham’s ministry fell in the summer of 1766 and
with Pitt’s refusal to allow a change in the handling
of American affairs, Dartmouth went into retirement.
While he was doubtless pleased to give greater attention
to his religious and philanthropic interests, he continued
his association with the Rockingham group** 3 and the several
pamphlets and papers relating to American problems that
remain in his papers bear witness to his continuing interest
in American affairs.****
At the end of 176? Horth Joined Crafton’s Ministry as
Chancellor of the Exchequer and it was natural that Dartmouth
should have become less ardent in opposition once his step
brother was a member of the administration.

His passivity

is apparent in his reply to Bockingham’s desire for him to
attend a Lords’ debate on resolutions regarding the Townshend
Acts x

My zeal for the welfare and prosperity of
the Americans and in them of this country,
the indignation X feel against those, who
upon partial and unfair representations of
a prejudiced and heated Governor, would drive
them to despair and above all, the value I
set upon your Lordship’s friendship inclines me
to wish myself now in consultation with you
upon the proper means to resist the resolu
tions . . . At the same time, the shortness
of the time to prepare myself for such an
event, together with the distance I am at * .
the snow that is in the air and will fall
before tomorrow morning, and a variety of
family reasons constrain me to lament that
administration will bring on their measures at
a time when they are not only sure of carry
ing them (which I am afraid they would do
at any time), but when many of those who do
not probably entertain exactly the saae ideas
with themselves are not in the way to declare
their disapprobation. My comfort Is that it
will be resolutely done by those who are
present and that my absence will be of no
more consequence than the loss of one in
effectual voice from the member of the
diesidents. ^
Later he fell out with the Rockinghamites over their policy
concerning the radical John Wilkes, and the way was pre
pared for his eventual political union with North.
Dartmouth’s love for and intimacy with North had not
ceased during the years they had belonged to separate po
litical groups.

In a teasing tone bespeaking both he wrote

to his stepfather in 1766, "Pray tell that perfidious swain
Lord North that we are not at all obliged to him for the
concise and peremptory note he sent us the other day, instead of bringing himself and Lady North to see us.
His admiration of North’s performance In office increased

at the same time his affection remained constant*

liT

In 1771 the ministry entered a crisis over the question
of war with Spain*

Lord Weymouth, who favored war against

Lord Worth's opposition to it, resigned his Seals as Secre
tary of State.

In attempts to strengthen his position in

the cabinet Worth offered this post first to Hardwicke^®
and, on his refusal to Lord Dartmouth*

The latter declined

as well for reasons which Worth said he could not do justice
1^9
to in a letter^
apparently it was his personal preference
for private life that made him disappoint his stepbrother.^
But while Worth understood Dartmouth’s reasons, his step
father did not*

In an anguished letter that must have

brought a like anguish to its reader, Guilford told him:
The more I reflect upon your refusal yes
terday, the more I am vexed. To have
you appear to the world wanting in duty
and regard to the King, love to your
country, friendship to Lord Worth, and
affection to me, is what I thought I should
never live to see.
I am too much hurt to
talk upon the subject.^1This breach in an otherwise devoted family healed quickly;
its significance lies in the pressure that memory of it
would bring to bear on the lari not to refuse Worth's second
bid to the Cabinet*
That came in August of 1772.

In order to make Worth's

need for Dartmouth's presence in the administration clear,
Bargar^2 details the Prime Minister’s difficulties with its
other members.

Worth had joined the ministry in 17&7, and

16

took the leadership In 17T 0 when Grafton resigned the
Treasury.

Though he had no particular following of his

own, nor any set of principles that distinguished him, he
kept his place by virtue of the "Mingfs confidence in him and
his ability at the Treasury and in Commons.

As a result

he was supported by the King’s Friends and several conser
vatives alienated from the Opposition by the Wilkes affair.
Grenville’s followers were weakened by his death in 1770
and then came over to ministry when Wedderburn and Suffolk
accepted offices in it.

north’s real difficulty lay in

his relationship with the members of the Bedford group-the "Bloomsbury Gang"--who were already in government when
he came in in 1767,

They were unreliable, often hostile,

with ill-concealed hopes that Worth’s coalition would
falter and they would be invited to head the government
and control the resulting patronage plums.

The only real

friend Worth had in the ministry was the Earl of Hillsborough,
Dartmouth’s successor at the Board of Trade and now Secretary
of State for the American Colonies.

As such, he became the

target of the Bedfords who hoped, in forcing him to resign,
to oust Worth as well.
Hillborough*s difficulty came when he rejected plans
for a western colony that many Influential Britons supported.
When the Privy Council overturned his recommendation that
the petition of the newly formed Ohio Company be dropped,
Hillsborough chose to retire rather than put the distasteful
project into effect*

Finding himself friendless in his own
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Cabinet, North then appealed to Dartmouth to take Hillsborough1©
office, and preserve the ministry from the Bedfords.

His

letter to his stepbrother graphically demonstrates the reasons
Dartmouth re-entered government employments
You can not, I think, doubt of my earnest
•wish to have you within the services of
the Crown, in a situation becoming your
rank, abilities, and character, and you
must be sensible how much I stand in need
of your friendship and assistance upon
the present occasion . . « Cif) you decline
my proposition, you will certainly distress
(jnej, if not the public service. 53
Such a request could scarcely be refused in view of Dartmouth*®
family relationships no matter how great his aversion to
political life, or his inclination towards personal pur
suits.

It is also clear that Dartmouth’s accession had

nothing to do with American policy.

In fact, North's first

attempt to solve the crisis had been to offer the Seals to
Lord Weymouth, who had refused.

His offer to Dartmouth

was made Mwithout taking any notice to the other ministers"^
who were doubtless disappointed by his acceptance.

Hot

only did Worth’s ministry not fall, but the American office
itself survived,^ and its patronage failed to devolve
upon the other two Secretaries.-^
0NE BMPIBB UNDER PARLIAMENT
Part of the general rejoicing in America that accompa
nied Dartmouth’s appointment was due to his reputation as
at once an amiable and a religious man.

But the main
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ground for Dartmouth’s popularity in the colonies was his
part in the repeal of the Stamp Act.

At that time he had

received many letters from the colonies, from private per
sons, and from colonial assemblies* congratulating him and
thanking him.-^

John Randolph even sent him a brace of

young eagles in appreciation.*^
But in praising repeal, of the obnoxious Stamp Act,
the colonists overlooked the Declaratory Act, and in thank
ing Dartmouth for ridding them of the former they failed
to understand his adherence to the latter.
ing to Mr. De Berdt as he left the Board of

In 1766, writ
Trade,

Dartmouth had said of the Americansj
I should always have been happy to have
assisted fthemj in promoting every wish
they could reasonably form consistent
with that subjection to the supreme
authority of the mother country, upon which
I think their own, as well as our welfare
and prosperity much depend; and which upon
the present principles of the general
constitution, they undoubtedly owe. 58
Dartmouth had, after all, taken his political principles
from his uncle and the old Whig Hewc&stle; like them he
could admit of no impairment to the authority of Parlia
ment.

Parliament’s claim to supremacy over the Empire

was'‘inherent in and inseparable from the supreme authority
of the State;” to deny it was "wild and extravagant . .
utterly inconsistent with any pretension to a share in the
privileges and advantages of British subjects.”59
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Yet with a touch of pragmatism seemingly out of charac
ter, he ‘
believed that Parliamentary supremacy, while it
could not be denied, should not be argued about with the
colonists.

Perhaps he took his cue from an undated paper
^A
Of suggestions for America in his manuscripts.
It recommended
that the Declaratory Act remain unrepealed, without saying
a word about it in subsequent negotiations.

The unlimited

supremacy of Parliament was not to be claimed on one side
or questioned on the other.

Then the aggrieving acts passed

since 1T63 could be undone.

Expressing this idea to Cushing

he said, '*If my wishes and sentiments could have any
weight with a British Parliament, the exercise of fits
rightsj . . . should be suspended and lie dormant till
some occasion should arise . . .

in which the expediency

and necessity of such exercise should be obvious . . . ."59
The altercation Governor Hutchinson got into with
the Assembly of Massachusetts Bay in 1773 was exactly what
Dartmouth did not wish to happen.

Hutchinson initiated

the dispute by opening the session with an address claiming
that the colony was either totally subject to Parliament
or completely independent; the Assembly predictably re
plied that Parliament had no authority to bind them what
soever and further petitioned for Hutchinson’s removal.
The ministry was, as Franklin so aptly put it, "Chagrined
with his officiousness, their intention having been to let
all contention subside, and by degrees suffer matters to
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/TT
return to the old channel.”

Dartmouth wrote Hutchinson

that it was "vain to hope that the Council and House of
Representatives can he induced to yield due obedience to
the laws of Parliament,” and urged him to avoid further
^o
discussion.
But the damage had been done and Dartmouth's
attempts to mend it are illustrative not only of his rather
naive approach but of the essential unmendability of the
difficulties *
First he tried to avoid laying the dispatches about
the affair before Parliament, knowing that it would feel
called upon to take some action to defend its sovereignty
which would only make the situation worse.

Since accounts

had already appeared in the newspapers this tactic was
hopeless.

Then he tried to get Franklin to convince the

assembly to withdraw their Declaration.

"I wish they

could be persuaded to reconsider the matter, and do it of
themselves, voluntarily, and thus leave things between us
on the old footing, the points undiscussed," he told the
agent in anrinterview.

But Franklin replied, "If they

were even to wish matters back in the situation before the
governor’s speech, and the dispute obliterated, they
cannot withdraw their answer till he first withdraws his
speech, which methinks would be an awkward operation that
perhaps he will hardly be directed to perform."

Franklin

then suggested that it would be prudent of Parliament to
allow the dispatches to lie on the table and take no
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further notice of them; it was, after all, quibbling over
"an authority they can never well exercise for want of
due information and knowledge, and therefore it is not
worth hazarding the mischief to preserve it."

Obviously

^ closed
Dartmouth could not agree, and the conversation 6 J
with his Lordship still urging Franklin to get the
Assembly to withdraw their petition*
But what Dartmouth would have had both parties to the
dispute ignore, was the one thing that was inevitably
driving them apart: their differing interpretations of the
constitution.

As time wore on the colonists added to

their denial of Parliamentary supervision an elevation of
the King that could only horrify an English Whig and even
the King himself.

King-in-Parliament^in eighteenth-century

Britain, was omnicompetent, and no derogation of this
competence, or of the legislative dominance of the Monarch,
could be suffered.
So the Americans* faith in Dartmouth as their advocate
in the administration was somewhat misplaced.

Because of

his association with the Bockingham Whigs and his role in
repealing the Stamp Act, they had assumed he was all on
their side.
error.

fiit

But this was not the only source of their

They were not mistaken in their assessment of the

American Secretary as one "disposed to concede every claim
of the colonies which can consist with their continuing
united to the K i n g d o m . H e

was, as Thomas Hutchinson
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described him^as amiable a man as you know--a man of
literature as well as good natural s e n s e , F r a n k l i n had
been treated rudely by Hillsborough, who had even balked at
recognizing him as a legitimate agent from Massachusetts
Bay: by contrast the new Secretary was most pleasant.

After

a conversation with Dartmouth on one occasion Franklin
remarked on the "complaisance in his contenance.

Indeed

Dartmouth was courteous at all timesj he never said any
thing unfavorable unless he had preceded it with some friend
ly remark.

In chastising Hutchinson on his dispute with

the Assembly, Dartmouth acknowledged first that he had meant
well,

Later, in relating his denial of the proposition

that taxation without representation was the equivalent of
slavery in a letter he was discussing with John Vardill,
he remarked first that he approved of its "good sense and
some of the opinions.”^7

His kindness was more than mere

diplomacy] it sprang from a real tenderness towards America
and a genuine hope for the end of contention.
Yet while diplomacy is of real value in politics when
it is insincere, Dartmouth's sincerity blinded him to the
crude realities of the situation and severely limited his
action.

As Hutchinson lamented, ’’His greatest foible is

an excess of humanity, which makes him apt sometimes to
think more favorably of some men than they deserve."^5
Franklin came to understand this as he complained that "he
is truly a good man, and wishes sincerely a good understand
ing with the colonies, but does not seem to have the
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strength equal to his wishes." 68

Arthur Lee was bitter:

The professions of Lord Dartmouth I
own give me very little confidence; he
was called upon last session of Parlia
ment by our unalterable friend Lord
Shelburne to account for his having
done nothing to conciliate the colonies;
he answered with fair promises; he will
again be called on by this same noble
Lord. I think he must then speak de
cisively, as any further evasion will
be palpable*^9
Such inability, in the light of future events, was
indeed palpable.

Aside from the nature of his own per

sonality, there were other obstacles Dartmouth faced as
he tried to reunite the mother country and her offspring.
Astute as ever Franklin guessed this when he wrote in
177k, "His Lordship expressed as usual.;much concern at the
differences subsisting, and wished they would be accomo
dated.
power.

Perhaps good wishes are all that are in his
A closer look at these obstacles should de

monstrate that the making of "fair promises" was the best
Dartmouth could hope to do.
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CHAPTER II
IMPEDIMENTS:

THE POLITICAL BACKDROP

GOVERNMENT BY PACTION AND PATRONAGE

The political scene at the time of the American Revo
lution has been convincingly recreated by many recent
authors; their revisions need only a brief description here
in order to create an appropriate setting for Lord Dart
mouth .
Eighteenth-century England was an age marked by vivid
and sometimes irreconcilable contrasts.1

The elegance of

Gainsborough shared a berth in history with the earthiness
of Hogarth; a kingdom deeply attached to a philosophy of
rule of law tr&s peopled with subjects who freely indulged
in the bloodiest of riots.

In retrospect, perhaps no con

trast has done historians such a disservice as that between
the political treatises and the political actualities of
the 1760’s and 1770’s.

That this contrast is now apprecia

ted is due to the work of many scholars, most notably
Lewis B . Namier.
As Namier pointed out, although this was a period
which could have divided thoughtful men on many significant
constitutional and theoretical questions, it was essentially
30
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an issueless era.

In spite of* the great decisions facing

Britain as a nation and an empire, political lines were
drawn less upon principle than upon personality and place.
The motivations for holding public office were more often
income and position than the desire to effect a given point
of view.

But saying this is not to condemn the men of

whom we are about to speak for lack of integrity.

As

Richard fares comments, "Our moral superiority is secured
by many profess ions."

la the eighteenth century public

life was simply the only acceptable way for a gentleman to
earn a living and the pursuit of personal interest in the
service of the state was not only permitted but encouraged.
There was nothing stinking about a sinecure or a plea for
an inherited office; these were necessary economic facts of
life for the upper classes much as life insurance or stock
portfolios are in twentieth-century America.

The purchase

of a parliamentary seat caused no raised eyebrows; it was
a proper way of providing for your sister’s son.
Under these circumstances, to belong to a party out
of office, without the prerogatives of patronage and influ
ence attendant with power, was an unfortunate circumstance
indeed.

The only recourse was to go into opposition and,

in Namier's words, "trump up grave dangers",,

3

in order to

bring down the ministry then in office and thereby improve
TunwxnetoiUi
one’s own position, not simply politically, but economically.
Herein is the genesis of what has appeared to our eyes,
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clouded as they are by the political habits of our own time,
as a genuine party system.

Only as we have come to under

stand the political and economic realities of the eighteenth
century have we been able to place the words and the deeds
of its actors on the proper stage.
Politics was personal and local.

Political ideals

assumed real importance only as they might affect personal
interest.

For example, the group around Newcastle, while

they were Court Whigs at heart, were forced into opposition
in the early 1760*s for fear of impotence when Bute controlled
access to George III.

Horace Walpole gives a typical illus

tration of the workings of Georgian politics with this
cryptic asides
The Court, about this time, made another
conquest, which it seemed little worth
their while to buy so dear, unless from
the intrinsic satisfaction of corrupting
a fair character. Cornwall quitted the
Opposition for a pension of 500 pounds a
year for life.
If there were no political parties in our sense of the
word there were political factions.

But the terms Whig and

Tory, so familiar to textbook readers on the American
Revolution, are almost idle distinctions in the task of
understanding these factions and the competition amongst
them.

North and others in office in the 17701® referred

to themselves as Whigs; the Rockinghamttes were Whigs also
but prefixed their party title with the adjectives "true”
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"high" "old” "grand" and "constitutional"; the Chatham!tes
were "independent" Whigs.

Old Tories split up and followed

all three groups, and Toryism, something of a pejorative
in the late eighteenth century, became more concerned with
local issues.^
To stay in office meant controlling as many places as
possible and insuring favorable occupancy of them.

Much

of a ministers time was necessarily given up to this task
as indicated by this letter from Lord North to his political
stage-manager, John Robinson:
Mr. Legge can afford only 400 pounds.
If he comes in for Lostwithiel he will
cost the public two thousand guineas.
Gascoign should have the refusal of
Tregony if he will pay one thousand
pounds, but I do not see why we should
bring him in cheaper than any other
servant of the Crown. If he will not
pay he must give way to Mr. Best or Mr.
Peachy . . . .
As the Duke of Newcastle
has come into our proposal we must
strain every nerve for his service.
Write my name to Mr. Luttrell to re
commend Mr. Pownall. ^
Money, connections and influence skillfully manipulated kept
a majority in Parliament and a government in power.

To

say that the political process was completely without poli
cies or principles would of course be an exaggeration, but
as a matter of emphasis, opinions were less important than
position and place.
Naturally, debate on the American question was affected
by such a political system.

Richard Pares points out,

3k

"only the Grenvilles could claim that their attitude was
determined by a consideration of policy . . .

Even the

Rockinghamites hadn’t been clear on the Stamp Act .
but once the colours were nailed to the mast, there was no
7
taking them down.'
The Boekinghams, in spite of their
clear identification with the American cause, still had the
goal of office uppermost in their minds . To this end they
pushed Pitt, who spoke strongly for the colonists, out of
their coalition and.took in the Bedfords who were antiQ
American. The American problems were often regarded simQ
ply as weapons to use against political enemies.
Such
political opportunism on the part of their English adher
ents confused and revolted the Americans as seen in this
angry letter from William Lee, an American merchant in
business in London, to his brother in Virginia:
Lord Shelburne I always thought as wicked
a man in politics as any in the nation
(Lord Mansfield not excepted) and now I
am perfectly convinced of it, as we know
for a certainty we owe the Boston Fort
Bill meeting with no opposition in the
House of Commons to his concurrence with
Lord Worth in the measure, for which he
was to be paid with the Lieutenancy for
Ireland and Barre was to be his Secretary.
I am rejoiced that Worth had cheated him
for after the dirty work was done, they
would not give him the bribe. He is a
complete Jesuit and thereby has ever de
ceived our Brother Templar [Arthur Lee)
whom I cannot convince that he is a
villain, though he cheated us in a bare
faced manner about our first petition to
the House of Lords against the Boston Port
Bill. 10
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Dartmouth, was no opportunist and was possessed of considera
bly more principle than most of his peers, hut his entry
into office was not influenced by his hopes for conciliating
the Americans.

It was simply his duty to help his step

brother maintain his hold on his ministry.
The constitutional, as well as the political habits of
Great Britain, influenced the outcome of her difficulties
with her colonies. The key figure in the political scene
was still the King, or perhaps it should be said, was again
the King, for part of George III* s difficulty lay in
the fact that he sought to reassert kingly leadership at
a time when Parliamentary leaders had taken the direction
of government upon themselves.

Newcastle had governed George

II but George III governed Lord North.11

The King retained

the power of appointing his ministers,' but his legislature
could overturn them.

Formerly ministers had used the

majorities in both houses as a weapon for forcing their
own policies upon the King, but George III countered by
dismissing them before their position was consolidated.^
George had his own ideas about what policy should be
followed and, being a conscientious man himself, he ex
pected all men of good will as their duty, first to accept
office and then and only then, to consider

p o l i c y .

^

while, as illustrated above, parties existed to gain
office rather than to chart a given course of action,

so,

36
political circumstances and royal influence did cause each
faction to assume office with some understending of the
In
direction of government affairs.
All of this is not to say that the English government,
corrupt by our standards, was without justice.

The English

constitution, greatly revered by all Englishmen and their
German King, provided a healthy balance of power by which
differing interests were protected.
a vast patronages

The King controlled

positions in the royal household,

government sinecures, deaneries, etc., and thirty or more
treasury boroughs, as well as pensions and p e e r a g e s b u t
this power could be matched by a combination of several
families of wealth with a desire to purchase office for
their friends.

And Parliament, as it was so vain in

reminding itself and the King as well as the Americans,
held the purse strings.
It was not only the purse strings, though, which gave
Parliament cause for vanity and made it so glorious in
the eyes of Englishmen.

The Revolution settlement had made

it the guardian against prerogative, and by the late
eighteenth century the results of the Revolution had come
to be almost universally admired.

While the legislature

was not a popular, democratic institution, it did repre
sent the varieties of British thought and was fairly responslve to public opinion.

15

It was, as Ian Christie allows,
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"appropriate for a deferential and hierarchical society.'
The King in Parliament was omnicompetent, but Parliament
was supreme.

THE PERSONALITIES OF POWER

The English constitution, it is duly noted, is not
and was not a rigid guide to the conduct of power.

In

evitably, then its workings have been deeply affected by
the personalities that have filled its offices.

This is

especially true of George III, reigning over great changes
in English government and empire.

In studying Dartmouth’s

role it is of value to cons ider briefly not only the
King’s personality, but that of his Prime Minister in 177^
and 1775, Lord North.
Not surprisingly, no one person has borne so large a
share of the blame for the difficulties of his reign as
the unfortunate George III.

Alternately caricatured as a

tyrant, madman or idiot; even revisionist studies emphasize-'his failings of character.

It is invariably pointed

out that the young king was studious, conscientious, pious
and dull, each in the extreme.

It is equally asserted
19
that he loved Britain and adored her constitution. x It
V
is not hard to see the direction his reign took from these
qualities; he knew he was more virtuous than the men
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around him; he devoted himself to deep thought on the
problems of his day; he reached conclusions he felt were
right; and his strong sense of duty to God and country gave
him the strength to persevere In them.

A youthful pro

jection of his reign, part of an "Essay on King Alfred”
written before he became King, embodies his estimate of
kingly authority:

"excellent were his laws, and vigorously

kept to; for he examined into everything himself."

And

further,
When all this is carefully examined, we
may safely affirm that no good and great
Prince . , . fond of the cause of
liberty will ever despair of restoring
his country to virtue, freedom and glory,
even though he mounts the throne in the
worst corrupted times, in storms of in
ward faction and the most threatening
circumstances without .^0
Wnhappily, a person of George’s mentality was as bound to
be as rigid in his opinions as he was incorrect, and his
opinions on the American question were no exception.

Like

many Englishmen he regarded the colonists as dependents,
obstreperous, undutiful, and ungrateful for the blood and
silver that the mother country had expended in securing
them.

Sooner or later they must come to acknowledge their

debt to the mother country.

But, if England must stand

firm in essentials, she could afford to be generous in de~
21
tails, and most agreed she had been.
George’s view of the constitutional divergence between
parent and offspring was simplistic--and indeed few in
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England at that time could conceive of a ground between
total subjection to Parliamentary authority and complete
independence.

"We must either master them or totally leave

them to themselves and treat them as aliens

22

Compromise

would be a "sacrilegious weakness"*^ and if his ministers
were not s t m g enough to maintain British rights, he
would step in their stead:
I have no doubt but the nation at
large sees the conduct of America in
its true light and 1 am certain any
other conduct but compelling obedi
ence would be ruinous and culpable,
therefore no consideration could bring
me to swerve from the present path
which I think myself in duty bound to
follow.24
Without

question in the King's mind, the Americans had to

be humbled and disciplined.

Writing

to Lord Worth in17?4

he said:
I was much pleased with your ideas
concerning the suspension of boun
ties and other regulations that may
be effected this session towards
bringing the Americans to the ir
duty, but I am more afraid of the
continuance of the dispute than the
colonies and I cannot think it
likely to make them reasonable; I
do not want to drive them to despair
but to submission, which nothing
but feeling the inconvenience of
their situation can bring their pride
to submit to.
Be had in mind his own methods as to how to bring the
Americans to this submission.
Had the Americans in prosecuting their
ill-grounded claims put on an appearance

of mildness it might have been very
difficult to chalk out the right path
to be pursued; but they have boldly
thrown off the mask and avowed that
nothing less than a total independence
of the British Legislature will
satisfy them; this indeed decides the
proper plan to be followed which is
to stop the trade of all those colonies
who obey the mandate of the Congress
for non-importation, non-exportation,
and non-consumption, to assist them
no further with presents to the Indians
and to give every kind of assistance to
those that conduct themselves otherways
which will make them quarrel among
themselves. Their separate (sic) in
terests must soon effect this and
experience will then show them that
the interference of the mother country
is essentially necessary to prevent
their becoming rivals.26
Part of his belief that a firm policy was necessary stemmed
from the repeal of the Stamp Acts

" * . .all men seem

now to feel that the fatal compliance in 1766 has encouraged
the Americans annually to increase their pretensions."

27
’

Confident that Heaven was with him he rigidly refused to
alter this policy even as the direction of the war should
have begun to show him that its failure was imminent:
"I entirely place my security in the protection of the
divine disposer of all things, and shall never look to the
right or to the left but steadily pursue the tract which my
Conscience dictates to be the right one.

jt was the

struggle to reach an unattainable goal, Namier says, that
29
helped to drive him insane.
Lord North was the minister inevitably appropriate for
such a King.^0

An even-tempered, affable man of character,
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knowledge and parliamentary skill, lie possessed the
winning combination of appealing to the king and being
able to maintain a majority in Parliament and thus hold
his government together.3^

He was a good speaker, capable

of managing finances and extremely loyal. But whether
32
from loyalty, indolence
or vacillation, he was willing
to let his king be sovereign in deed as well as name.
When his own views differed from those of his king, his
own gave way to the royal judgment, no matter how deeply
held or how crucial the question.

Though he disagreed with

George on American policy, and longed to resign, he
faithfully promised to remain in service and the eager
pleas of the King urging him to do so are amongst the most
pathetic of his letters.

He too paid an emotional price

for this inner tension between his inner feelings and the
outward manifestation of them in the form of a nervous
breakdown.33
George’s deep involvement in the conduct of government
is well documented.

Even so admiring a subject as Thomas

Hutchinson was surprised at the King's knowledge of the
affairs of Massachusetts Bay.

During Hutchinson’s inter

view in the closet in 1774 he found that George not only
was familiar with the general situation of the colony, but
was aware of Hutchinson’s relationship to the Olivers and
had participated in consideration of the newly appointed
34
council.
But great interest in and study of the American

k2

news did not guarantee that the King would deduce reasonable
conclusions.

Dartmouth sent him news of Lexington and

Concord immediately upon Its receipt in London; in his
replies he minimised its import and demonstrated his own
ill-founded optimism:
It is not improbable that some detach
ment sent by Lieutenant General Gage
may not have been strong enough to
disperse the provincials assembled at
Concord . . . .
I am far from thinking
the general has reason to be displeased;
the objectsof sending the detachment
was to spike cannons and to destroy
military stores; this has been effected.
I therefore hope you will not see this
in a stronger light than it deserves.35

.

The King then, was sovereign in deed as well as name.
Possessed of zeal unfettered by wisdom and served by a
prime minister with neither heart nor stomach to alter his
ideas, the directions of his policy would have been most
difficult to effect.

MECHANICS OF THE EXECUTIVE

Like the political modes and personalities, the
mechanics of the English government had considerable in
fluence on the way in which the American business was
conducted,
Even a sovereign King had to have ministers to carry
out his directives and since Parliament was supreme, they
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had to be men who could govern through its two Houses.

A

cabinet, composed of ministers of the first rank, was and
had been for some time in existence, having grown out of the
Privy Council in the first half of the eighteenth century.
It was not, of course, developed to the point with which
we are familiar.

The King controlled it primarily by his

power of appointment, which appointments, as mentioned
before, he expected to entertain no particular policies
upon entering office.

Ministerial responsibility was as

yet an undeveloped concept, for in order for the ministers
to take a full collective responsibility they must be assured
that the king would accept their collective advice, and
certainly not veto bills that they had steered through
Parliament.

But George III commanded a large amount of

patronage and with this degree of political independence,
he not only could, but often did, flout his ministers.3^
While Newcastle had used royal patronage to build a
strength in Parliament with which to rule George II, George
III "called the bluff on this technique" by dismissing his
ministers before they amassed such power.
He regarded
38
them as his "tools".
The necessity for coalition cabinets
further increased his political power since he was able to
play upon their internal divisions. 39
The main function of the cabinet was to give advice
on policy and administration.

It was questionable, however,
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whether the King was duty hound either to request or to re
ceive it.

And although he did not attend cabinet meetings,

his influence upon them was large: 4 he very subjects of
40
deliberation were within his discretion.
He kept in close
touch with his ministers both by correspondence and
meeting with them individually in his "closet". At these
sessions each minister was restricted to a consideration
of affairs within the jurisdiction of his office; with the
prime minister alone did the King discuss matters of a
41
general nature.
If George and the minister concerned
agreed upon a particular issue, it usually was not brought
before the whole cabinet.

Plainly, under such a system the

King was able to give full direction to government business.
A final note on the functioning of the cabinet helps
to explain the dilemma in which Dartmouth found himself
during 1774 and 1775*

In reaching decisions upon the

questions it did debate, and these included American policy,
42
a majority of members present
ruled. Dissensions were
rare once the minutes of a decision had been drawn up
because the strength of the administration, i.e., its
ability to remain in office, lay in unity.

Thus it was

possible that loyalty to his stepbrother might easily con
flict with the Colonial Secretary’s personal views on
Colonial policy.
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These were the political facts of life for Dartmouth
as well as his contemporaries, accepted without real ques
tion as to their efficacy or justice.

That they adversely

affected any meaningful search for a solution to the
American problems has been indicated and will become clearer
as the course of events is studied more closely.

That

Dartmouth, while a creature of his times in some ways was
temperamentally out of time with them in most instances,
should be apparent from the above and the sketch of his
personality and character in Chapter I.

Had any statesman

been able to surmount these obstacles to bring peace and
understanding between mother country and her colonies, it
would not have been the amiable Earl.
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CHAPTER III
IMPEDIMENTS:

THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND CORRESPONDENCE

THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT

Though Britain's empire grew and developed during the
eighteenth century its apparatus for handling imperial
business did not.

The joint stewardship of the Secretary

of the Southern Department and the Board of Trade, with
responsibility for various details left to other respective
offices, such as the War Office, was woefully out of date.
Herein was reflected the English misconception that the
colonies were so much a part of England that no separate
administration was necessary.

In 1J6S the government re\
vised this system but, typically, the impetus was not

\

improvement in the handling of Colonial affairs, but con
solidation of George Ill's political position.

If, as

Margaret Speetor points out, efficiency had been the goal of
revision, the President of the Board of Trade could have
1
been elevated to a cabinet position.
A third Secretary
was instituted instead, with the intent of stabilising
Chatham’s ministry by partitioning Shelburne's patronage.
The Inception of the office was unfortunate, not only from

50
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the point of view of the development of a sound American
policy, hut because it always appeared to be inferior to
that of the other two Secretaries of State creating a
continuing and delicate problem throughout Dartmouth's
2
tenure.
The American Department was organised in a similar
fashion to that of the other Departments of State| there
were two under-secretaries, a first clerk, two senior
clerks, seven ordinary clerks, a chamber and a deputy
3
chamber keeper and a necessary woman.
As is often the case
with civil servants, these officers retained their positions
even when the secretaryship changed hands,

While the

others probably played an insignificant role, the under
secretaries during Dartmouth's tenure, John Pownall and
William Knox, played important parts in the struggle to
prevent separation.
Exactly how much influence they exerted on the direction
of policy is difficult to ascertain though clearly it
increased when they enjoyed the close personal relation
ship that characterized Dartmouth's dealings with John
b
Pownall and Lord George Germaine's with William Knox.
Their significance becomes evident as their activities are
examined.
Both men had what would seem to have been a sound
background for their positions as undersecretary.

Pownall,
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the older brother of a governor of Massachusetts Bay, had
started his career in 17^1 as a clerk with the Board of
Trade and by 1758 had risen to first secretary, ranking just
below the President.

Knox had actually lived in America for

several years, serving as Provost Marshall and a member of
the Council for Georgia.

Contemporaries seem to have

regarded them as intelligent and honest.^

But if their

acquaintance with colonial affairs and their native ability
were extensive, their points of view, especially for the
Americans, were unfortunate.
Pownall shared the opinion and principles of Lord
Hillsborough, and at any rate, seemed less concerned with
solving the American problems than protecting his depart
ment and its patronage from encroachment by either of the
2
two "ancient" secretaries.
While he was not as extreme
in his firmness as the Bedfords or even the King, he was
far from sharing the liberal viewpoints of his brother
Thomas.

Knox, who had been unimpressed with 'democracy1

in America, was in sympathy with the ideas of George Gren
ville, even to the point of defending them in several

6

articulate pamphlets.

Like Pownall, he was not wholly

opposed to small concessions to the colonies, he was still
7
notorious enough to be hung and burned in effigy in America.'
At least some Englishmen were concerned with the effect of
their presence in the office of the Secretary of State, for
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Dartmouth received an anonymous letter warning him that they
would ”carry with them . . * all the injurious and illiberal
8
ideas . . * of their late Lord.”
It was ironic, especially
in Knox’s case, that though they were widely regarded as
experts on America, they failed to understand the American
psychology.
The chief responsibility of the undersecretaries, and
perhaps the chief way in which they exerted their influence,
was in the handling of the correspondence of the office,
with the colonies and with other departments.

The bulk of

it concerned the governors who were required to report
periodically on their activities and the general and parti10
cular affairs of their colonies,
Pownall and Knox read
this huge volume, and selected from it what it was necessary
for the secretary to see and give directions upon.

Much

of the work was routine and easily--sometImes better-handled by the undersecretaries, who drafted replies for
11
their superior’s signature.
So the secretary, who at
any rate already had a full schedule attending to his pri
vate and political business, was spared even reading a
/
ip
great deal of the material.
Some of the replies went out
under the undersecretary’s own signatures.

Besides routine

matters, Pownall and Knox carried out their own correspon
dence with some of the colonial governors, (for example,
Hutchinson, Tryon, Wright and Simpson) who trusted them to

relay what was necessary to Dartmouth.
A look at an example of the handling of the more
significant pieces of mail reveals the balance of Influence
between King, cabinet, secretary and undersecretary.

Using

the principals with which we are presently concerned:
Pownall reads a dispatbh from Governor Hutchinson of
Massachusetts Bay concerning a serious matter.

He brings

it to Dartmouth's attention, who upon considering what his
reply should be, consults North, George III and eventually
the cabinet.

Upon getting the sense of what he needs to

say, he then gives Pownall fairly specific directions

Ik

but

leaves the form and phraseology of the letter to the under
secretary.

Then a draft is submitted to the secretary for

his signature.
The procedure takes on added significance when it is
followed without the presence of the secretary.

Dartmouth

was often absent for weeks at a time, on trips to his
estates at Staffordshire or Yorkshire, during which he
expected to transact no official business.

In such a case,

Pownall presented his problem directly to the Prime Ministe
or King for instructions, or occasionally received His
Majesty’s wishes through one of the other Secretaries of
I5
State.
The resulting letter was then sent, f&lt accompli
to Dartmouth at Sandwell for signing, or signed by the othe
16
Secretaries of State, Suffolk or Bochford.
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The only fair conclusion to draw from the above is
that the official papers reflect the policies of the secretary
and his colleagues rather than the undersecretaries unless
his subordinates happened to suggest or agree with them.
There is considerable evidence that they did both.

Aside

from the initiatives demonstrated in handling the colonial
office correspondence, abstracting the year’s dispatches,
17
attending levees, preparing memos for cabinet meetings 1
18
and even calling a cabinet meeting occasionally,
Pownall
and Knox did originate several aspects of American policy
and were called upon for their ideas in drafting royal
speeches to Parliament and several pieces of Colonial
19
legislation.
Something of the manner of origin of some
legislation is sensed in a letter from Pownall to Knox of
December 3, 1T73:
I am rejoiced to hear you are so much
better. When you can think of business
without being disturbed by it, I have
got something for you that, whilst it
amuses you*, will greatly lighten the
burdens of your faithful servant. After
so many years neglect of the business
of Quebec, everything now is to be done
in a hurry. Lord North has begged that
he may have from us a precis of the
affairs of Quebec from the first estab
lishment of it, so far as regards the
claims and complaints of the new sub
jects, and what is passed there upon,
etc. You know how little able I am to
sit down to such a work, and you know
that nobody but you or I can do it.^O
The Knox manuscripts provide information on other
policies coming from the undersecretaries.

Pownall
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apparently recommended the Boston Port Bill

21

and Knox

conceived the idea behind the Conciliatory Proposition in
22
1775
well as making military suggestions.
Letters in
the Dartmouth manuscripts at Patshull further suggest that
Pownall was responsible for the recall of Hutchinson and
later the implementation of the proclamation for the
rebellion in August of 1J75*

la these ways the undersecre

taries "exercised an influence out of proportion to their
2k
office*.*.
The picture that emerges from this examination of how
the American business was conducted should be clear:

the

sole direction of American policy did not rest with the
American Secretary.

The information received by him from

the colonies was selected by subordinates, and they phrased
the dispatches that went out.

Prom their experience they

were able to make acceptable and well regarded suggestions
of proper courses of action.

Major issues went all the way

to the King and Cabinet before being resolved.

Then the

American Secretary was indeed a "tool" for carrying out their
25
joint resolution.

HEWS FROM AMERICA

In terms of sheer bulk, the volume of news from America
left in the records of the Colonial office is impressive.
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But naturally, its significance is not to be found in its
poundage, but in its content, and it is our purpose bere to
examine and evaluate the official and unofficial information
coming to Dartmouth from the thirteen colonies, and to
speculate upon its probable effect on him.
The Colonial Office received, along "with the letters
of the various governors describing conditions within their
Jurisdictions, many enclosures in the forms of newspapers,
pamphlets, broadsides, assembly speeches and records, petitions
to the governor, minutes of town meetings, etc.

Besides

these official communications, Dartmouth corresponded with
several Americans, notably Joseph Reed and Thomas Cushing,
26
had the benefit of perusing intercepted private mail,
and conversed directly with Colonial Agents and other
Americans in London.

A first impression on studying this

mine of material is that British officialdom,

27

despite the

ocean of time and miles separating it from its American
subjects, could not have been ignorant of their activities
and opinions.
The governors’ letters, even those from Bull and Went
worth which were not nearly so full and descriptive as those
of Bunmore and Tryon, give a remarkable picture of the
build-up of the revolutionary fervor and organisation.
Dartmouth entered office Just after the Gasp^e incident and
it was shortly thereafter that the extra-legal Committees
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of Correspondence were set up.

Of this and all subsequent

rebel activity, he was vividly informed.

Governor Hutchin

son of Massachusetts Bay was writing as early as 1773 of
the spread of Boston’s truculence and its malevolent effect
when he wrote that ’’the expectation of an union of measures
in . . . Pennsylvania, Hew York,

and Massachusetts Bay,

has raised a higher spirit here than X have ever seen before.
After the Committees of Correspondence came the election
of Provincial Congresses, selection of delegates to Congress,
the Continental Congress with its restrictions on commerce
and consumption, the arming of the rebels, Committees of
Safety, and the final erosion of royal authority in America,
all ofwhich were
pondence.

duly chronicled in the official corres

But to know was not to sympathize andcertainly

a letter such as the following one from Hutchinson describing
the manners of the Liberty Boys in intimidating the Tea
Consignees in Massachusetts Bay did little to ease tensions!
On the 17th in the evening between
one and two hundred people beset the
house . . . where Mr. Clark, another
of the consignees lives, who was at
home with his children about him.
Their numbers, as they were passing
greatly increased and though they
intend to surprise yet they could
not help discovering themselves by
their horns and whistles, instruments
appropriate to a Boston mob. Mr.
Clark had just time to secure his
door, and send his female visitors

"2 8
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to the upper part of the house and
for himself and three or four male
visitors to betake themselves to the
lower chambers. The mob attempted
to open the door but finding it se
cured tried to force it. Some of the
gentlemen called to them from the
chamber windows, told them they were
armed and would fire upon them if they
did not desist. At length one of Mr.
Clark’s sons aimed at the mob who
was forcing the door but missed him.
They withdrew for a short space and
returned with double violence, broke
the glass and frames of the windows
and did other damage. Several of Mr.
Clark’s friends found their way into
the house, and after near two hours
the mob dispersed. The next day a
town meeting was held and a committee
was appointed to inquire of the con
signees whether they had not received
such advices as would enable them to
answer the request of the town.
They gave a Joint answer that it was
not in their power to comply with
their request.^9
A man of Dartmouth’s mien was doubtless deeply shocked and
indignant at such behavior, at not only the violence of
the mob, but the thinly veiled use of it by the town meet
ing .
Naturally, there was a different viet of the difficulties
between the mother countries and her colonies coming to him
from Joseph Reed.

The brother-in-law of a London merchant

friendly with Dartmouth, Reed had taken up a correspondence
with the American Secretary from a sincere and not unfounded
belief that the American cause in England had been hurt by the

6o
’'advices of either ignorant or interested men,"

30

Thus

he undertook an "endeavor to inform CDartmouthJ . . . truly
31
and faithfully of our present views and situation."
His
letters attempt to present the Colonial grievances in a
tactful way so that "perhaps by a little temporising and
removing real grievances in the [[government’s mode of conducting a particular measure'] the measure itself could be
preserved."

32

He described the unfair and out-of-date pos-fed
32
rates, the "rudeness and incivility"
of crown officials,
the incompetency of Admiralty Court Officers*

Most espe

cially, he struggled to present the constitutional reasons
for American resistance, "the principle which has given rise
.31
to the present commotion."
He carefully distinguished
between a "supreme" and an "absolute" power--while he was
willing to grant the former to Parliament, he would withhold
the latter, for he could not imagine that there should be
"a more divine right . . .
King,"

in Parliament, than in the

To Dartmouth’s argument that the colonists should

obey the laws once enacted, he responded with "the principles
of the Revolution showing that there are certain cases
30
wherein resistance is Justifiable."
Along with American grievances and rights, Reed stressed
unanimity and the prominence of Americans in opposition to
Parliamentary taxation and the Tea Act in particular.

In

sending Dartmouth news of the return of Philadelphia’a tea

6l

he assured him that those who effected it were "the most
considerable in both rank and property.”

33

Throughout his

correspondence he discounted the dissentients with such
claims as ’’some divisions have arisen in this place, as to
the mode of showing our sympathy with Boston; but your
Lordship may rely upon it that nine-tenths of the inhabitants
mean to show their sense of the conduct of the mother
country towards them, by adopting every prudent measure for
their relief."

Always he tried to present an American

point of view.

Congress was pictured as a "not illegal"

body representing "the true and real designs" of Americans
35
and perhaps serving to prevent bloodshed.
In describing
Philadelphia, he wrote, "this city has been distinguished
for its peaceable and regular demeanor . . . there have been
no mobs, no insults to individuals, no injury to private
property."^
As 177^ wore on he became more urgent in his
representations as he warned of the impending civil war.
Still he found reason to hope for an accommodation, and
suggested one to Dartmouth along these lines:
We are, indeed much misinformed if it is
not your Lordship's opinion, as well as
many others, that if you have the right
[of taxation], it is not expedient to
exercise it. Suppose this was declared
by an act of Parliament, the Boston Acts
repealed, and satisfaction for the tea
made; with much deference, I submit, such

37
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procedure would create such a confidence,
and excite such gratitude as would dis
pose the colonies to concur in any
proposition for settling the Constitution
of America upon reasonable principles^
and raising the so much desired revenue;
if that be thought too hazardous an
experiment, I verily believe a submission
to all acts of Parliament of general
superintendence, and control of trade
without reference to revenue, might be
relied upon. If any encouragement were
given to commissioners from the several
assemblies, to attend the conference in
Great Britain, and the Boston Act suspended
in the interim, I incline to think most of
the colonies would now accede to such a
measure ."38
Terms such as these must have appeared incredible to
Dartmouth, and their coming from one calling himself a
moderate, one who had "the most passionate and sincere
30
desire to see a reconciliation"
must have discouraged
him.
While Heed was writing him that America would never
submit to the Tea Act and that the Coercive Acts were
uniting the colonists in antagonism toward to the mother
country, General Gage reported that:
In Boston the greatest pains have been,
and are taking to oppose all measures
tending to open the port, by flattering
the people with assistance from the other
provinces--promises of collections and
presents to enable them to subsist, and
the happy effect of the general Congress,
which they make no.doubt will force
Great Britain into their own terms. On
the other hand, several gentlemen, also
through fear of the tyranny under which
they live, dared not to act or speak,
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encouraged now by the late resolutions
of the government, have ventured to step
forth and are endeavoring to persuade the
people to comply with the act of Parlia
ment as the only means to save their
town from ruin. Til’ they are pinched
and find they are deceived in their hopes
of support by presents and collect ions,
the affair will probably rest in this
situation. But the Act must certainly
sooner or later work its own way* They
will not agree to non-importation either
in New York or Philadelphia, or even in
this province . .
A month earlier Reed had warned that if the Port Bill had
been founded on the belief that Massachusetts would be
isolated, that it was poorly founded--that every colony
would come to her aid.

k-1

In the previous December he had

advised Dartmouth that "severities have been tried . . .
I cannot but be firtily persuaded that the repeal of this
whole Of©a} Act would ensure the future submission . . .
to any other act of the British Parliament now in force."

)| p

At the same time Tryon advised him that repeal would be
43
dangerous and encourage illicit trade.
Dartmouth’s
manuscripts are full of such conflicting observations.
typical example:

A

on May 1 5 , 177^ Major General Haldimand

wrote from America on the predicted reaction of Boston to
the Port Bill;

"It is the opinion of many people here that

they will acknowledge their fault."

On May 20, 177^-> Joseph

Ward opined that "the violent measures which are adopted
to subject the Americans will never prosper and are pregnant
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with ruin to the nation.'1^
While Heed recommended repeal of the 'Intolerable
Acts', Governor Martin warned from Worth Carolina "that
forbearance, indulgence, relaxations and concessions serve
only to encourage usurpation and to beget new and unrea45
sonable demands."
From Virginia Dunmore advised him to
close American ports, cut off American trade with foreign
countries and even shut each colony off from every other
46
colony.
Despite his correspondence with the Americans
these voices of crown officials were the ones that Dartmouth
heard.^
And what did they say?

In the first place these men

wanted to say what would be acceptable to the ministry.
This is perhaps what led Gage to over-optimistically report
on the Port Bill soon after his arrival in America as
Governor of Massachusetts Bay that "I hear from many that
the act has staggered the most presumptuous; but minds so
inflamed cannot cool at once, so it may be better to give
the shock they have received time to operate and I may find
the assembly in a better temper than usual and more inclined
to comply with the King's expectations at Salem."

48

Only

a few months later he wrote to Barrington that "affairs here
are worse than even in the time of the Stamp Act, I don't
mean in Boston, but throughout the country.
Provinces . . . are . . .

The New England

in arms, and the question is not

now whether you shall quell the revolt in Boston, hut
49
whether those provinces shall he conquered . . ."
Furthermore, colonial points of view were typically
presented in an unfavorable light.

Thus Governor Penn,

in writing of an expected petition to convene the assembly
for discussion of the Boston Port Bill referred to it as
an "affrontive application," and promised darkly to "treat
50
it as it deserves."
In struggling to exonerate them
selves from any blame for the unhappy turn of events the
Governors attempted to show that it was the colonists who
were responsible for the degeneration of relations.

But

they are not perhaps to be condemned for seeking approbation
for their conduct for they were, after all, forced to
follow instructions that time and distance often made
irrelevant or inapplicable and yet binding; self-preserva
tion dictated that they fully expiate their own behavior.
As part of this effort they tended to disregard the
legitimate and constitutional grievances so emphasised by
Reed and ascribed the colonial resistance to ulterior
motives on the part of the resisters.

Martin wrote that

the opposition to government, more "specious" than "real",
"hath arisen from the interested views of a few individuals.
The cause of Cone particular argumentj was the disappoint51
ment of two candidates for Treasurer's office . . . "
This assertion was echoed by Hutchinson

5P

and Dunmore,
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the latter suggesting he have more officers to appoint so
that he could increase the friends of government and keep
down faction.

Lieutenant Governor Bull treated the Liberty

Boys with even more contempt when he wrote of the appeal of
their cause that ’’the uniform of cloathing invites the young
men to enlist, and after their exercise they go to the
tavern, and there indulge in social joys and doubtless
ck
mix politics with their wine . * «.
Martin talked of a
"mob" stimulated by "sedition” and "liquor” .55

All of the

governors commonly referred to the patriots as the "lower
ranks" and the "rabble"*

As for the virtue of the American

goals that Heed stressed, a letter from Martin countered in
describing an inland trip from New York to North Carolina
In the late fall of 177k*

"The most false, base, and

scandalous suggestions, reports and insinuations that
unprincipled men can invent . . * are readily swallowed by
the poor deluded people, whose extreme Ignorance and
credulity, exposes them to receive every imposition that
56
crafty and ill-designing men practice upon them."
The correspondence of the crown officials differs from
Reed’s in yet another way:

while the Philadelphian sbessed

the unity of the Americans in opposing the designs of
Parliament upon their liberty, the governor

letters almost

universally claim that the "liberty faction" is small, that,
as Hutchinson wrote in 1773> the "body of people" were "far
from perverse", and only delufed by a few designing men.

57

6?
58
If the faction was small,

it followed, as Cage claimed,

"that if a respectable force is seen in the field, the
most obnoxious of the leaders seized, and a pardon proclaimed
CA
for all others, government will come off victorious*”
The feeling of several of the governors, especially those
from the southern colonies, was .that even when the rebellion
grew in daring and numbers, there were numerous moderates,
/
friend® of government who in fear of the admittedly rigorous
retribution dealt loyalists, would not speak out.

Hutchin

son had warned in May of 177^ that the moderates would
do
be without hope until troops arrived.
As late as the
summer of 1775 Campbell was writing that the back country
leaders assured him they wanted nothing but arms and
61
ammunition and 1,000 men would be raised.
Bunmore pointed
out the situation of "people of the first property, and
I

believe the number greater than (might) appear, who

foresee the ruin which these disorders must bring upon the
country, and who place their hope® in the perseverance of
His Majesty and the parliament, of being rescued from the
62
tyranny of licentiousness."
The plight of these loyal
V
subjects must have touched Dartmouth and he** "Likely winced at
the indignation Campbell expressed at the "tojtal neglect”
of the southern colonies $
Your Lordship will, I am sure, excuse
my warmth when I acquaint you that

yesterday under the color of law
they hanged and burnt an unfortunate
wretch, a free negro of considerable
property, one of the most valuable
and useful men, in his way, in the
province, on suspicion of instigating
an insurrection for which I am
convinced there was not the least
ground, I could not save him my Lord I
The very reflection harrows my soul!
I have only the comfort to think I
left no means untried. They have
now dipped their hands in blood. God
Almighty knows when it will e n d . ® 3
Finally, in reviewing the information coming into
the American office, the difficulty of time must be con
sidered.

The letters took four to six weeks to get to

England, if the packet was on time.

It took several more

weeks for the news to be digested, action taken and replies
made, and then another four to six weeks before these
reached America.

The Inherent obstacles are obvious.

After hostilities began the government packet was discon
tinued and communication became still more uncertain, but
even before this letters often didn’t get through.

Several

of Hutchinson's letters in the Public Record Office are
6k
marked "duplieate--original not received."
Some very
significant news was late in coming, for example, the offi
cial version of Lexington and Concord arrived some 12 days
after a patriot account had Jostled London.

The time lag

also made planning difficult, especially during debate of
the Boston Port Bill.

There was not enough time to send

across the Atlantic to see whether Boston was willing to
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pay for the tea before passing a punitive measure, or to
give her the alternative.

Similarly it would have taken too

long to assess the effects of the Port Bill before passing
65
the other Coercive Acts .
Other pitiful examples of this
are seen in the fact that for all practical purposes the
Conciliatory Proposition was rendered obsolete by the news
of Lexington and Concord, and in Dartmouth’s losing battle
to postpone the Proclamation of Rebellion until after the
Second Continental Congress had been heard from.
To summarize, the news from America, while full, was
conflicting and prejudiced.
sources have implied,

66

It was not a question, as some

of not having enough information,

or not having seen the petitions of the colonists.
Unhappily, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters,
Dartmouth favored his official dispatches over unofficial
"advices1*$ and while they fanned his hopes for conciliation,
the same time they alienated him from the very Americans
he hoped to conciliate.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLICY OF COERCION

INDEPENDENCY IN ACTION AS WELL AS DECLARATION

The Boston Tea Party was the turning point in Lord
Dartmouth1® thinking on the American guestIon*

Before the

Tea Party he had hoped, albeit naively and vainly that a
policy of non-aggravation on both sides would suffice to
heal the differences between colony and mother country.
He did not really desert this policy after the Tea Party,
but he realised that the differences could no longer be
totally ignored*
When that ill-disguised tribe of Indians chose to
repudiate Parliamentary sovereignty by throwing the East
India Companyfs tea into Boston Harbor, they were destroy
ing private property, a crime that cost them their best
friends in England*

More important for Dartmouth, however,

they were committing an act that could not be tabled by the
British Parliament.

In their conversation on the Declara

tion of Independency that the Massachusetts Assembly had
made in reply to Hutchinson*® defense of Parliamentary
prerogative, Franklin had told Dartmouth that "It I® words
76

77
only.

Acts of Parliament are still submitted to there.

Ho force is used to obstruct their execution.

While that

1
is the case, Parliament would do well to turn a deaf ear.11
But here was outright disobedience. Dartmouth was stunned
2
and grieved.
He had considered himself a "real friend to
3
the constitutional rights and liberties of America."
He
had thought it likely that the repugnant Tea Act would be
overturned in the session of Parliament underway when news
of the turbulence arrived*

How, he wrote his friend John

Thornton, the colonists should know
how fatally and effectually they have . .
shut the door against all possibility
of present relief for any of the things
they complain of, and how utterly vain it
must be to expect that Parliament will
ever give it to them till there appears
to be a change in their temper and con
duct . CO.would be thought as mad as
they if
were to say a word of repeal
ing the tea duty now.^
To Dartmouth, whether or not Parliament had the right
to lay the tea duty, to resist Parliament’s authority by
opposing the execution of the law in the manner ©f Boston
was "clearly treasonable . . . upon the principles of every
government upon earth*

3

In his mind the taxation question-

which he had felt and still did feel could be held in
abeyance--must now be shunted aside by this larger question
of whether the laws of Parliament would be submitted to
in America* "If the people of America say no," he wrote
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privately to Reed,
they say in effect that they will
no longer be a part of the British
Empire: they change the'whole ground
of the controversy--they no longer
contend that Parliament has not a
right to enact a particular provision-they say that if has no right to con
sider them as at all within its
Jurisdiction. 3
Either the colonists submitted, or they were independent.
While Dartmouth could pose this alternative in theory,
he could not bring liimself to accept the latter choice.
"We are yetone Empire,11 he
and in 177^

had told Franklin in 1773,^

there was still, for Dartmouth,

"hope, that
p

principles of another
At the

nature will prevail."

same time it was obvious to him that some action

stronger than hope must repair the assault to Parliament's
authority.

Franklin had wisely warned him some months

before that "violent measures against the province will not
change the opinion of the people.

Force [can] do no

But lack of action had not preserved the peace.

good,

Sir Francis

Bernard wrote the Secretary a general rebellion could be
averted if the government would pursue coercive measures, 5
an opinion that must have struck a responsive chord in
Dartmouth, for he wrote Hutchinson that
I am sensible how greatly the *
constitutJfcnal imbecility of the
government in . . . Massachusetts
Bay is increased by popular preju
dices, and yet, the vigilance, the
firmness, and the activity of the
civil power, are the only circum
stances from which the subject can
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expect . » . protection in the exercise
of his lawful commerce * It is upon these
efforts that the preservation of the
public peace must depend . • . *
Ihat this civil power could not cope with its problems
at this time became evident from the Governor’s letters
that the

’Indians’would not be tried and the tea would

not bepaid fot J

Clearly,

Massachusetts must be made

to obey the laws of its mother country.

As he wrote Gage

concerning the governments
It is not only its dignity and reputa
tion, but its power, nay its very existence
depends upon the present moment; for
shcuLd those ideas of independence, which
some dangerous and ill-designing persons
here are artfully endeavoring to instil
into the minds of the King’s American
subjects, once take root, that relation
between this kingdom and its colonies,
which is the bond of peace and power will
soon cease to exist and destruction must
follow disunion.
Further, Dartmouth’s sympathy towards the grievances
the Americans claimed was limited by his English point of
view and the prejudiced accounts of the governors.

He

failed to understand the very real American fear of British
tyranny; he was certain, he wrote Keed, that ”1 need not
take pains to convince you of the absurdity of the idea
which has been held out to the common people in inflammatory
papers on your side of the water, that the intention of
government is to enslave the people of America . . . ”

He

8o
felt further that ’’the liberties of America are not so
much in danger from anything Parliament has done, or is
likely to do here, as from the violence and misconduct of
America itself.”

The letters of the British governors had

brought him to believe that the radicals were small in
number and that while they had perhaps developed a wide
following, the people had been duped by an unscrupulous,
ambitious, few.

Here the effects of the governors* view

points on Dartmouth*s thinking were forceful and unfortu
nate.

He was also discouraged by their intransigence;

writing to Wentworth in Hew Hampshire he had admitted that,
”1 cannot suggest any step to be taken that would not be
more likely to strengthen, than remove their prejudices." 9
Boston had an old reputation as a bad apple in the
barrel of colonial grievances.

Her reputation sank even

lower when Franklin*s part in the publication of the Whately
letters became known only a week after the news of the tea
10
party arrived.
The Lord Chancellor, Lord Apsley, wrote
Dartmouth that it was necessary "to mark out Boston and
11
separate that town from the rest of the delinquents."
In fact, North told Hutchinson after his arrival in
England, the mother country had been patient long enough;
'some changes should have been made before, especially after
the Assembly's Declaration of Independency the previous
12
summer.
"There was" Dartmouth had written "no room to
hope for the restoration of order and regular government

8l

till the sentiments of those who see the necessity of a
due acknowledgement of the supreme power of the whole
empire, and the absurdity of a contrary doctrine, shall
lo
become the prevailing and ruling principle of the province." ^

SSCUBING THE DEPENDENCE OF THE COLONIES

Dartmouth's conclusion that a coercive policy was
necessary and justified is not surprising in view of the
general British reaction to the tea party.
down, feeling was against the Bostonians.

From the King
The colony's

own agent was shocked and hoped for a speedy reparation from
the town; even Chatham could not condone the destruction
Of the private property of an innocent party.

”1 suppose

we never had since we were a people so few friends in
Ik
Britain,"
Franklin lamented to Cushing; "the violent
destruction of the tea seems to have united all parties
agains t ( W ) ."

Most Englishmen not only believed that

coercion was justified, but also that it would succeed in
bringing Boston to terms. The King wrote to North, relay
ing a conversation with Gage, in which Gage said, "they will
be lions whilst we are lambs; but if we take the resolute
part, they will undoubtedly prove very meek,

t^age] thinks

four regiments . . . sent to Boston . . . are enough to
prevent any disturbance."

15

In view of such sentiments,

the political situation of the times, and the relationship
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of North to his step-brother and to the King, Dartmouth
would not have been able to make his opinion prevail, even
if his personal opinion had been against coercion.
Accordingly, Dartmouth wrote Gage,
It is fit I should acquaint you that it
is the King’s firm resolution, upon the
unanimous advice of his confidential
servants, to pursue such measures as
shall be effectual for securing the de
pendence ^gf the colonies upon this
Kingdom.
Exactly what this "resolute part" was to be was a question
of some difficulty.
Dartmouth had been aware, as in his letter to Rockingham
in 1768, that the letters from the governors must be
"partial" and "prejudiced"; but perhaps because of that
"foible" of which Hutchinson had accused him, of believing
people better than they were, he persisted

in the wishful

thinking that the violences committed in America were the
actions of only a small group.

It followed logically that

if that small group could be punished, if they could be weeded
out of the troubled Boston garden, that the friends of
government would spring up and dutiful obedience to his
Majesty’s laws would return.
News of the destruction of the tea had arrived in
London on the twentieth of January, 177^•

On the twenty-

ninth began a series of cabinet meetings to determine what
17
particular measures would be adopted.
Exhibiting his concern

CO

for the lawful conduct of government and Ills belle]

w

narrowness of opposition to it, Dartmouth suggested
the King direct the Governor of the province to mov« ihe seat
of government to a place least likely to he influenced by
the town of Boston, and to move the customhouse to another
port#

18

At the same meeting the Attorney and Solicitor

General were directed to consider whether the actions of
19
Boston were treasonous.
The following day the cabinet
discussed measures to be pursued if the report of the law
officers should conclude that there was adequate ground to
20
warrant criminal proceedings against the Indians.
A
fortnight later, though the idea of criminal proceedings
was still being considered, it had been agreed that the
Boston Port Bill and the Massachusetts Government Act would
20
be presented to Parliament*
The Port Bill, closing the port to ail commerce, was
the first of the acts to become law, and it passed with
20
almost no opposition in either house,
Labaree reports
that the Earl of Buckinghamshire had vigorously proposed
punishing the town by stopping Boston’s commerce with 10,000
troops and a fleet of Ik sail, on February 1.

Dartmouth got

him to withdraw the motion then because all of the American
23
news was not yet In*
This particular action then was not extraordinary to
Englishmen in 177^, and the idea of assessing a whole town

Qk

for the crimes of some individuals was not regarded as novel
either.

North pointed out in Parliament that it could not

be helped if the innocent were punished with the guilty,
for the innocents had failed to act against the guilty and
2b
therefore the whole town must make restitution.
Even
Franklin told Cushing that "tho# the mischief was the act of
persons unknown, yet as probably they cannot be found or
brought to answer for it, there seems to be some reasonable
25
claim on the society at large in which it happened."
In
Dartmouth’s papers is a memo in his own hand considering how
Boston was to be assessed, in which it is clear he planned
26
to assess the whole town.
It is very probable then, in
view of this and his own feelings as relayed to Thornton
and Heed, that the American Secretary supported the Port
Bill.
It is interesting that the action was taken by the
ministry, through Parliament.

The Attorney General and

Solicitor General had ruled that the King could remove the
customhouse on his own authority.

As mentioned above, Knox

tells us that Pownall made the suggestion of the Bill and
Labaree claims that the reason for It was to stiffen the
punishment by not allowing ships to use another customhouse
27
in Boston harbor.
But for Dartmouth this must have had
a deeper meaning:

his reason for supporting coercion was to

bring the colonies to obey the laws of Parliament.

When

Franklin had admonished him that mere troops could not
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force an acknowledgement of Parliamentary supremacy from
the colonists, Dartmouth had agreed.

"I do not know, that

force would he thought of; but perhaps an act may pass to
lay them under some inconveniences . . . "28

Now he believed

that the "inconveniences” of the port closing would force
the Bostonians to pay for the tea, and in doing so they
would be submitting to an act of Parliament whether they
admitted it or not*

In an interview with Hutchinson and

George III in the King’s closet after the governor had
arrived in London in July, Dartmouth clarified his feeling
on what Bostonians needed to do to reopen their port.
Hutchinson was concerned that no specific acknowledgement
of the right of Parliament to tax them was required, as he
knew it would not be forthcoming.

Dartmouth agreed that

this was not necessary and said that
Such orderly behaviour in the inhabitants
in general as would enable the governor
to represent to {the King) that there
was an apparent disposition to give no
molestation to persons who would carry on
their trade . . * conformable to law;
and the assembly and the towns abstain
ing from these offensive roles and
resolves and encouraging disorders
. . .
may be considered evidence of such submiss ion."29
"Actions speak louder than words", the King added, acquiescing
in what Dartmouth had said.

Here again is Dartmouth1s feeling

that discussion of rights should be avoided; if the colonists
would just obey and not argue about Parliamentary supre
macy, Britain would not force them to admit it.

Dartmouth had written Hutchinson that only two measures
"a suspension . . .

of all the privileges at present enjoyed

by the town of Boston as the seat of government and a place
of trade, and an effectual and immediate punishment of
those who had been the ringleaders in the very criminal
30
transactions there*" -- were under review. If there was to
be any hope for an end to the troubles however, some reform
was necessary.

Changes in the government of Massachusetts

Bay were first thought of in connection with moving the seat
of government from Boston to a less turbulent place.

It

was a short step from this to altering the constitution in
such a way as to cure its "democratical" evils--which
Dartmouth among others felt were the reasons that that
province excelled all others in undutiful conduct.

Knox

apparently suggested changing the mode of securing members
31
of the Council from election to Crown appointment.
This
had been considered before, and now Dartmouth agreed to it.
It is not difficult to see why in reading some of Hutchinson
letters, such as one speaking of the upper house which "by
so many changes made in it for seven or eight years" is
"so modelled that nobody is left to oppose the designs of
the new modellers of government with the least degree of
spirit or, in most cases, to say nay to the proposals made
32
to them.’
Writing of the Council to Gage shortly after
receiving this letter Dartmouth said "any hope of proper
advice or assistance from them would be vain." 33

According

to both Knox and the King,

Dartmouth approved this part of

the Government Act; but, Knox wrote, "neither of us wished
to make any further alterations in the charter." 35

As it

turned out this was a minority opinion in the Cabinet and
Dartmouth was overruled.

Knox blames the extension of char

ter changes to town meetings and juries on Sir Frances
Bernard who "unluckily came to town" at that time with plans
for them.

Pownall told Hutchinson that he had not favored

altering the constitution, even the Council* since he
believed that if the Governor would exert himself in using
his negative he might get a good Council under the estab
lished method.

"Lord Mansfield," however, "pushed the matter

and upbraided [the cabinet for] their late irresolution,"^
which resulted in passage of the Government Act.

A letter

from George III to North tends to support Pownall’s version
as he says "the more I reflect on Lord Mansfield's opinion ..
concerning the altering of the Charter; the more I am
confirmed in the propriety (of

In any event, the

unit rule prevailed in the cabinet and though Dartmouth was
outvoted on part of the Bill he was called upon to defend
it in Parliament, where it received more opposition than had
the Port Bill, but was in no danger of not passing.
Dartmouth was also anxious to bring to justice the
particular individuals who had so flagrantly insulted the
mother country.

When the cabinet met on February
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Dartmouth asked the legal officers;
to the crime of high treason?

MD>o) these acts amount

If so who Care! the persons

chargeable and how should they be p r o s e c u t e d ? The reply
to the first question, gives on February IX was

”y««w*

"Aa

attempt, concerted with much deliberation and made with opes
force . . . to obstruct the execution of an Act of Parliament
imposing a duty on tea and to put a general restraint upon
the exercise of lawful trade” was treasonous, amounting to
on
“the levying of war against his Majesty.''
The further
conclusion was that the accused could be tried

either in

America or in England, based on an old statute dating back
to the days of Henry Till.

Since this answer was affirmative,

Dartmouth was anxious to ensure punishment of the guilty
because of his over-optimistic belief that their adherents
were small in number and that punishment would
ple.

set an exam

Besides they deserved punishment* His feelings

well displayed in a conversation with Hutchinson*

were

According

to the Governor, he "spake with great ©motion; that he was
hot one who thirsted for blood; but he could not help saying
that he wished to see H_______ K and A_______ jae brought to
the punishment they deserved:

and he feared peace would not

be restored until some examples were made, which would deter
jj| A

the others.*1

By the end of February it was decided that

there was not enough evidence to bring specific charges and
hi
the idea of Crown prosecution was dropped*

While Dartmouth was anxious for the radicals to be
brought to justice, he did not support their being transported
to England for trial.

He had opposed such a measure in 1772

when it was considered in connection with the Gaspee incident
because he believed "it legal for the person to take his
k2
trial in the country where the offence was committed."
Hie position had not changed, in spite of the fact that
everyone in England realized that conviction would have been
impossible in Massachusetts.

If the conviction of rebel

leaders was not possible, it was also apparent that crown
officers engaged to suppress defiance of Parliament's laws
might be brought to trial "before persons who do not ac.>3
knowledge the validity of those laws.
Their conviction
would be certain.

The fear arising from this logic was that

the King's servants would be less than zealous in performing
their duties, which in the case of Massachusetts Bay might
prove disastrous.

The solution, ae in the other instance

of a partial jury, was to bring such an offender to England
where he would be assured of a "fair trial."

Dartmouth

could not support such a step in this case any more than he
could have when the accused were persons he very much wanted
to see convicted; but he was aware of the difficulty and
suggested "that offenders of that particular province should
A3
be amenable to the Courts of Justice of Nova Scotia."
The
Administration of Justice Act, drawn to protect those enforcing
the law in Massachusetts, was henceforth broadened to provide
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for trial either in England or another colony, and Dartmouth,
having effected what was for him a significant change,
supported it.
The Quartering Act, despicable as it seemed to the
Americans, was only the natural result of the others as far
as the ministry was concerned.

Parliament had decreed that

the laws would be enforced; it must send officers of the
Crown to enforce them and these must be housed.

If the

colony did not provide quarters, then the commander*-in
chief could billet his troops in such empty houses, barns
and outhouses as he thought necessary.

Dartmouth could not

have objected to this since he now felt that soldiers were,
needed to keep order.

The practice was essentially the

same as that long employed in England itself.
The colonists included a fifth act, The Quebec Act,
as part of this group they labelled "intolerable".

This

law is now generally regarded as a most enlightened act of
statesmanship, carefully designed to meet the needs of
non-English subjects.

But in an atmosphere clouded by

Parliament's alteration of the Massachusetts Charter, it
seemed in America to be part of a gradual plot to subvert
liberties and establish tyranny.

The Act legalized hated

Homan Catholicism, discontinued English law and land-holding
practices in favor of French, and denied to Quebec the elected
assembly promised at the end of the Seven Years War.

Even

a moderate like Joseph Reed could not place this act in its
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perspective, for he wrote the

Secretary:

The idea of bringing down the Canadians
and savages upon the English colonies,
is so inconsistent not only with mercy,
but the justice and humanity of the
mother country, that I cannot allow myself
to think that your.Lordship would promote
the {Quebec Bill.^j ^
The ministry, however, especially Dartmouth, knowing the
purity of their own motives, was never able to fully com
prehend the American reaction.
Considerable criticism has been heaped upon Dartmouth
for his role in these proceedings.

How could a "friend

of America" take part in them with honor?
this question should already be clear.

The answer to

Dartmouth believed

in the supremacy of Parliament; he was horrified at the
defiance of the law that had been exhibited by, as he
thought, a small group of radicals; he was determined to
vindicate the authority of the mother country.

Although

he supported a policy of coercion, he was still attached
to his former plan of letting tempers cool, and he did not
want to proceed beyond the necessary vindication to inflame
the colonists further.

He still hoped for an eventual

repeal of the Tea Act.

But when the general rancour of

British reaction drove his colleagues to harsher measures,
he had no choice but to acquiesce in the decision of the
Cabinet.

He could neither protest the policy aloud nor

resign, since it would weaken his step-brother *s ministerial
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position in a time of crisis.

Certainly too he must have

felt that he had some leeway in putting the laws into effect.
For example, in spite of the fact that troops and a military
governor were sent, he Instructed Gage to
use every endeavor to quiet the minds
of the people, to remove their preju
dices, and by mild and gentle persua
sion, to induce submission on their
part . . . 4-5
As Bargar points out, a Hillsborough or a Germain would have
given a different spirit to coercion.

ROOM FOR HOPS

Gage left England in April with his instructions and
news of the Boston Port Bill, which was to take effect
June 1.

Thus it was the middle of May before the colonies

received definite word of the ministry's action and well
into summer before they learned of the other "Intolerable
Acts", the Massachusetts Government Act, the Administration
of Justice Aet£ the Quartering Act, and the Quebec Act.
No one in England, Including, as hasbeen
and Gage,

seen, Dartmouth

thought that these acts wouldhave the desired

effects on the colonists immediately.

So the familiar delay

of trans-Atlantic communication and the expected time of
adjustment to Parliament's firm intentions, combined to
keep Dartmouth suspended in an agony of vain hope for the
summer and fall of 1774.
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Optimism reigned at first.
to

Writing to Gage in reply

a letter of May 19,Dartmouth exulted:
The state in which you found things . .
was better than I expected, and from
what has passed since, . . . there is
room to hope . . . that the tranquillity
of the Province, and the authority of
the Government in it, will speedily be
restored . . . ^

Astime wore on there was less and less "room
Dartmouth, true to his

to hope",

nature, would not give up.

but

InAugust

he wrote privately to Gage from Blackheath expressing conkS
fidence in his ability to restore peace.
His feelings
at

this time were further reflected in a letter that was

probably drafted by Pownall:
It is evident from the dispatches I
had the satisfaction to receive from you . .
that although the measures adopted res
pecting the Province of Massachusetts Bay
had not yet had, and will not perhaps for
some time have their complete effect, yet
that they have so far succeeded as to
encourage many good men to stand forth in
opposition to those who are wickedly, but,
I trust, vainly, endeavouring to urge the
people to violent . . . resolutions. 9
At this time there was still no expectation that the other
colonies would come to Boston's aid; when Boston realized
that no assistance would be forthcoming, the letter insisted,
"the hour of distress must soon come that will, I hope,
awaken the people to a right sense of their situation . . .
It is much to be lamented that . . . Boston

. . . (could)

still . . . believe that the measures they . * . adopt are

likely to attain the . . . union with this count'
47
profess to desire."
Wo redress would be possible
obedience first.
During this period of waiting, great hopes were placed
on the Congress, and Hutchinson wrote in his Diary that
Dartmouth had told him nothing would be done until news of
50
what had transpired there arrived.
Apparently there were
no great fears of the results of this convention in spite
of its extra-legal origin.

Worth told Hutchinson in early

August that he had heard that the orders of merchants had
been large and he felt on this account that non-importation
51
agreements were unlikely.
Most optimistic was William Knox
who believed that Congress would consider some plan for a
central government and find it so impracticable that they
would accede gladly to the supreme controlling power of
Parliament, for defense against enemies and to prevent
52
quarrels amongst themselves.
As for Dartmouth, he expressed
"great concern" at the method since grievances would have a
more potent effect coming from the individual colonies, but
he still "wishCed) that the result of their proceedings may
be such as not to cut off all hope of that union which is
so essential to the happiness of both." 5 3
Disillusionment came gradually.

Bull wrote as early

as July that far from having any "happy effect towards
composing disturbances", the Acts of Parliament had "nised
a universal spirit of jealousy against Great Britain, and

vn

9

5^
of unanimity towards each other.”

Other governors were

telling a like tale; by September Gage was forced to write
that "the flames of sedition have spread universally through
out the country."

The only remedy he could suggest was "to

secure the friends of government in Boston, and to reinforce
the troops here with as many more as could possibly be
55
collected."
Hutchinson found Dartmouth beginning to des56
pair.
The Secretary wrote disconsolately to Gage that
while he "had entertained hopes” that the "popular phrenay"
would subside, it now appeared that:
notwithstanding the assistance of so
large a military force sent purposely
to support the authority of civil
government! they still have it in their
power to trample upon it with impunity
and to bid defiance to all controul.
£sic)" 57
Even with the writing so plainly on the wall, Dartmouth
could conclude his letter with "X cannot but persuade myself
that even in the Hew England governments . . . there are
many friends of the constitution who would stand forth,
57
under the protection of Government.”
Embarrassingly, it was not possible to protect them.
Ho troops could be spared from present forces or raised
anew before winter. The Cabinet decided to send three ships
58
of the line
and Dartmouth impractically inquired of Gage
if it was possible to disarm the people of Massachusetts Bay,
Bhode Island and Connecticut.

59

Gage could not keep order

and yet the Secretary asks him to effect disarmament,*
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Hiteheson says that the Cabinet had decided to postpone
mobilization, to continue attempts to isolate Massachusetts*

6Q

We can only suppose that distance is partly responsible for
this lack of realism on the part of Dartmouth and the
ministry.
English opinion on the colonies had begun to harden.
Hutchinson had recorded in mid-October that Dartmouth*e
earlier hopes for a repeal of the tea duty had faded.

"*This

could not be,* he said, *they would not believe the kingdom
61
was in earnest.1*’
What was the essence, the vital point
of the dispute for the colonists, could not be given up.
Even as liberal a plan as that advanced by former Governor
Thomas Povnall, for a Congress of Deputies to be chosen by
the American Assemblies with a Crown Moderator, did not
envision the giving up of Parliamentary supremacy.

As

Dartmouth himself put it "‘Parliament can do nothing which
will do so much as carry any appearance of conceding to such
62
a claim.1"
The King wrote Worth in September that while
he had"no objection” to seeing that no "feeh taxes” were
laid on the Americans, he was clear "there must always be
/*Q
one tax to keep up the right."
Worse news was yet to come:

at the end of October word

arrived that the Congress had adopted the Suffolk Hesolves
urged by the Boston delegation.

These resolves proclaimed

home rule for the colonies, excepting only that "we

cheerfully consent to the operation of such Acts of the
British Parliament, as (regulate) our external commerce
for the purpose of securing . . . commercial advantages
6^
(for) the whole empire.”
They further stipulated the
Inviolability of their Charters, trial by their peers, and
right of assembly* the unconstitutional!ty of appointed
Councils, and ended by proclaiming that all acts adopted
since 1763 , demonstrating “a system formed to enslave
(Aljt
America,
must be repealed. In order to force Britain
into such repeal, the Congress voted "An Association"
providing non*importation, non*consumption and non**exporta
tion, of British goods.
Dartmouth was "thunder struck" at the news and queried
Hutchinson anxiously as to whether the newspaper accounts
could be relied on.

When the governor assured him they

were likely genuine the Secretary could only regret that it
65
65
was now impossible to give way.
Both Pownall
and Knox
were similarly afffected, the latter "much altered" after
his earlier optimism and told Hutchinson that "all treaty
is over . . . the first thing will be to let America know,
that Britain will support its authority and then concede what

66

shall be thought fit.”

Barth was similarly disposed

saying that "it was no purpose any longer to think of
expedients:

the Province was in actual rebellion, and must

be subdued . . , the Acts must and should be carried Into
67
execution,”
He further informed Hutchinson:
"I will
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venture to tell you that Parliament was dissolved on this
account-*that we might, at the beginning of a Parliament
take such measures as we could depend upon a Parliament to
67
prosecute to effect.**
The King may have influenced the
darkness of Horth*s mood in this conversation with the gover
nor, for George III had written his minister the night
before that:
I am not sorry that the line of conduct
seems now chalked out , . . . The Hew
England governments are in a state of
rebellion, blows must decide whether they
are to be subject to this country or
Independent. ^
Along with the Resolves and the Association, Congress
had designed a Petition to the King praying for redress
of their grievances.

It is indicative of how far the

Americans had come towards a federal concept of empire that
they desired Franklin, and several other agents and friends
of America, to present it directly to the King, hoping for
his intercession in their battle with Parliament.

Franklin

wrote Charles Thomson, Secretary of the Congress, that he
had instead, decided to present it to Dartmouth "that being
69
the regular official method.”
Unfortunately the petition was not delivered until
almost two months after news of Congress's other actions
had arrived and obviously with the disposition of British
officialdom already soured by those actions, the petition
was destined for an unfavourable reception.

Its first
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difficulty, however, came from the 1friends * Congress
had designated to submit it to the throne.

Of the six

named, three, among them Edmund Burke, "declined being
concerned with i t a n d

another was out of town.

Paul

Wentworth gave, as his reason to Pownall, that the petition
was "an assertion of all their claims in a very high tone
TO
and with very offensive expressions*” 1

Eventually,

Franklin, Lee and Bollan, immoderates in British eyes,
took it to Dartmouth.

Diplomatic as always, and still

anxious not to shut the door on discussions that might bear
T1
fruit, he called it a "decent and proper petition," ' and
69
promised, after looking at if himself,
to deliver it to
George III.

We can only assume that the Secretary caused

this added delay in order to be assured that it was not
so intemperate as to further alienate an already embittered
sovereign*

Ironically, for the colonists, the King then

laid it before Parliament on the nineteenth of January, with
all of the other papers on America.
11 was Congress1s total action rather than the petition
itself which caused it to be eventually ignored by the
legislature.

As Hutchinson wrote, in spite of its "decent

and respectful language," it could not be approved because
"all the proceedings of Congress, from which the address
72
cannot be separated, are utterly inadmiesable.
At his
Levee on December twenty-second North had told the governor;
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"'They did not deny the right.*"

But, Hutchinson replied,

"'They . . . accompany it with papers, which deny the right.1”
After further discussion on the composition and merits of
the petition Hutchinson wrote:
I could plainly perceive that it would
have been very agreeable to him to have
found something in D O that would
lead to an accomodation, and if if had
not been for the extravagance of the
Resolves, Association and Addresses
passed by this convention, notwithstanding
the illegality of their assembling, which
would have been winked at, the Petition
would have been attended to."73
Dartmouth echoed this attitude in a letter to an unknown
addre ssee;
, . . The people of America have never
taken one step that has the least appearance
of a tendency towards reconciliation and
accomodation: had the proceedings of the
Congress, illegal as that assembly is, carried
with them any disposition of this sort, I can
have no doubt that government would have
been ready to give all due encouragement to
such disposition."7^
Without such disposition there was little the government
could do.
In spite of growing disgust at America and the seating
of a new Parliament, the ministry was slow to take action.
Amidst despatches from Gage warning that "civil government
is near its end" and letters from New York demonstrating th&t
even that colony wherein loyalty was anticipated as nowhere
else, was on the verge "conspiring" with her sisters against
7h
Parliamentary claims,
the cabinet's only action was to

IPX
query the Attorney and Solicitor General on whether treason
and rebellion were being perpetrated, and if so, to
draft a proclamation calling on the guilty to surrender or
75
be treated as traitors*
A circular letter was sent in
mid-December notifying the governors of his Majesty’s
’’resolution" to withstand every attempt to weaken "the
authority of the f^upreme legislature over all his Majesty’s
dominions," and Parliament’s approbation thereof in order
to remove those false impressions which have been made * . *
and put an end to these expectations of support of their
unwarrantable pretentions, which have been held forth by
artful and designing men.

!fhere was, as so much faith

had been placed in his mission, a growing dissatisfaction
with Gage for his "inactivity and irresolution" because
things had not gone w e l l . ^

Any definitive action was

postponed until after Christmas when the outcome of the
petition would be clear, although no one questioned the
need for some definitive action.

As Dartmouth explained to

Hutchinson on one occasion when he asked the governor’s
advices
fhere was no doubt that every one who
had signed the Association, was guilty
of treason, and if he was to be direc
ted by the resentment natural upon
the first news of such an insult, the
most vigorous measures would immediately
be pursued In order to punishment,
{j3ie3 but it was an affair to be well
considered, and deliberated upon. 80
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Perhaps part of the Secretary*a decision to deliberate at
length ataft&ed from a desire to give time for other at tamp t a
at peace to show resalts*
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CHAPTER 7
COERCION AID COHClIIATIQI

SEARCHING FOR COMMOH GEOUHB

When the neve of the summer of 17?4 and finally the
action.# of Congress- demonstrated that the colonies were
united and that the coercive acts had failed to make them
obey Parliamentary laws, Dartmouth saw the need of alter**
lag the stance of mother country to colony.

He did not

desert his earlier belief that the colonies deserved tome
punishment and must he brought* by "inconveniences" to
1
obey Parliament, but he realised that since the steps taken
to bring this about had not succeeded, something else must
be done#

lie- approach in the winter of 1?75 was twofold?

to remind the colonies publicly that the mother country was
determined to maintain its authority, while nevertheless
demonstrating its benevolence and good intention®! and to
seek in person or privately to come to an understanding with
American leaders#

Unfortunately, each party to the dispute

had now reached an extremespo sit ion from which they could not
compromise*

Dartmouth, as a moderate, was caught in the

middle and blamed by both sides*
109
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While Congress and Parliament made their demands public,
Dartmouth was enough of a diplomat to know that some of them
had to be negotiated in private.

He still believed that

union "upon some general constitutional plan is certainly
very just" and, he wrote to Lt. Governor Golden of Hew York,
"I have no doubt of its being yet attainable through some
2

channel of mutual consideration and discussion."

Early in the fall Dartmouth had supported an idea of
Pownall's for a royal commission to go from England to treat
with the colonials, or in Pownall’s words "to enquire into
the causes of the disorders and discontent existing at pre„3
sent in America.
Both sides must give way to settle a
dispute he knew; as Knox wrote later:
However determined we all were that the
colonies should obey the sovereign
authority of Parliament, we all thought
taxation ought to be given up in practice,
and that the colonies should be invited
to make some proposition for the
equivalent. I went further, and thought
there were many unjust as well as impolitic
restraints on the foreign commerce of the
colonies and Ireland. 4
This commission would facilitate negotiations by appointing
three representatives of the King "to meet deputies from the
4
colonies, to discuss and settle all claims."
Quite
properly, for Pownall and his colleagues, Parliament was to
confirm What had been agreed upon, providing of course, that
it was approved by the legislature.

The idea was tentatively

accepted by the Cabinet on the condition that the charge to

Ill

the commissioners was satisfactory to them.

Knox complains

that Povnall then spoiled his own idea by maneuvering to
become part of the Commission) when he found he would not
be going to America as one of its members, he altered the
format to provide one high commissioner to whom he would be
secretary.

This single commissioner, again according to

Knox, then had too much authority and dignity to suit the
Cabinet who feared it would seem too much like an American
Parliament and rejected the whole idea.

While both Mansfield

and Dartmouth still favored it, the King, Bedford and Suffolk
did not, so for political reasons, the Prime Minister
5
dropped it.
But "Dartmouth still insisted that something should be
Ifheld out to the colonies" and since this "ehannel of mutual
consideration and discussion” had not worked out he began
exploring another in the form of a series of private meetings
between his personal physician, Dr. Fothergill, David Barclay,
and Benjamin Franklin.

For diplomacy's sake, the meetings

were shrouded in secrecy and it is not now apparent how they
3
were initiated.
Fothergill, a widely respected Quaker and
a ”Whig of decided opinions,” with "close ties and sympathies
with the American colonists,
Franklin for a number of years.

had been acquainted with
Sharing intellectual interests,

they had corresponded on electricity before meeting, and had
5
become good friends when Franklin went to England in 1757*
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Fothergill was seeing Dartmouth daily In a medical capacity
and it is not unlikely that his anxiety over the current
state of affairs compelled him to offer his services as an
intermediary, Peeking to find some ground on which the two
6
sides could meet.
David Barclay, a friend of Fothergill's,
was similarly close to Lord Hyde, a minor member of the
administration similarly disposed to conciliation, and
together they approached Franklin.

Later a further negotia

tion, this one between Admiral Lord Howe and Franklin took
place in which Howe broached the idea of the Commission to
Franklin.

Franklin agreed to this, but his terms to Howe

were not really any different than those he had held out to
Fothergill and Barclay.
An intermediary was necessary at this point, for while
Dartmouth and the colonial agent had had several frank dis
cussions in 1773> Dartmouth and other members of the adminis
tration had lost faith in him in the wake of the Whately
7
letters episode.
Moreover, Franklin had been badly singed
by Wedderburn's personal attack on him during the Privy
Council hearing on the matter.

The American and the American
8
Secretary had not seen each other since, although Franklin
was frequently in company with English radicals such as Mrs.
MacCauley and the Bishop of St. Asaph, and members of the
Opposition.

This was unfortunate because the breach in their

thinking had widened, especially in so far as Franklin was
concerned.

1X3
In any event Franklin gave Barclay and Fothergill some
"Hints for a conversation upon the subject of terms that
may probably

produce

a durable Union between Great Britain

and her CoXouie*, * which was then passed on to Hyde and
9
Dartmouth*
Both read it, for there are notes on the manuscript
10
11
in both hands*
It is probable that North saw it as well*
Dartmouth had expected to give some Inducement towards
conciliation, but Franklin f© proposals were far-reaching
and the concessions that the ministry was prepared to make
were entirely unacceptable to the American*

He felt the
12
Hints" had been rejected "in spirit if not in form,"
and

he was probably correct.

For although the mercantile theory

received its ©hare of colonial wrath, the main disagreement
arose over the constitutional issue©*
demand© were:

Included in Franklin’s

no taxation, no troops without consent of

the assembly, legislative control of the salaries of crown
officials, revocation of the law whereby person© accused of
treason might be transported to England for trial, and
reenactment by the colonial legislature© of the acts of trade
and navigation and the act for establishing the Admiralty
Courts*
rule*

1*3

This, for all practical purposes, amounted to home
The qualifications imposed on these demand© by the

ministers clearly demonstrated that they were not willing to
make such a concession*

Their conception of the Empire

necessitated a sovereign Parliament*

\

Agreement was further complicated hy the fact that,
gave Chatham, no one in England, including Dartmouth, could
think of repealing the Coercive Acta, which had been designed
to secure this essential submission to Parliamentary laws
from the colonists*

But, Fothergill wrote Dartmouth, "as

a concession to pay a tax was the sine qua non on this side,

so a rescinding of those Acts, or rather repealing them, is
1it
the term of reconciliation on the other#"*
He continued
that if the offensive acts were repealed "we have not the
least doubt but America would Immediately return to every
15
Just expression of duty both in language and conduct#* /
In view of the history of the last decade, Dartmouth and the
rest of the ministry must have doubted this and their doubt
certainly colored their reception of the last plan Barclay’s
optimism conceiveds

the agents would petition for repeal,

promising to pay for the tea, and the acts would be suspended
while commissioners went to America (Howe and Hyde were
%

considered) in lieu of more troops.

16

Franklin accepted this

and Fothergill carried the plan to Dartmouth who regretfully
rejected it.

Dartmouth was willing to repeal only one of

the Coercive Acts, the Boston Port Bill.

Restitution for the

tea (upon which Franklin staked his personal fortune)

n It

justified suspension of the Port Bill, for It signified obe
dience to Parliament, but the other Acts had been for the
purposes of reformation and in the case of the Quebec Act,
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seemed to Dartmouth to hear no relation to "the present
contest.Here

the fear of Parliament’s intentions and

power on the part of America, so Incomprehensible to the
American Secretary, becomes significant,

Franklin would not

settle for less than total repeal for ”while Parliament
claimed and exercised a power of altering our constitutions
X8
at pleasure,” he wrote, Hhere could he no agreement,”
fbUB this attempt at negotiation failed also, and, at this
point it must be apparent that negotiation was really no
longer possible.
Fothergill, in his letter to Dartmouth had lamented!
Was the whole of Administration as
cordially disposed to peace and sensible
of its advantages as Lord Dartmouth,
I think there would be very little
difficulty in accomplishing It, But X
see and perceive so strong a current
another way, that I despair , . , 15
Fothergill was correct in his assessment of Dartmouth’s
concern and certainly other members of the Cabinet were
unwilling to temporize with America at all*

But for

Dartmouth, as for them, the essence of the dispute could not
be given up without disaster*

He was discouraged that the

talks had produced no results, and exasperatedly asked
Hutchinson if he thought any proposals could be made to
satisfy the Americans*

In January DeBerdt had written Heed

of Dartmouth’s assurance to him "that if the Americans expect
that Great Britain will grant all their requisitions, as
contained in the petition of Congress, an accomodation will
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neyer take place*w

Ae the Secretary had himself written

his American correspondentt

"You observe that if neither

Parliament nor America will recede, the most dreadful cause-*
quencee will ensue*

If that were the ease, can any

reasonable man have a doubt which of them should recede, or
■HI
at whose door the guilt of those consequences would lie? * ■
So Dartmouth, while unwilling to end the hope of a channel
for conciliation, (for example, he continued to solicit
letters from Heed after Heed stopped writing in February,
v 22
17T5), ' was likewise unwilling to pay the great price the
Americans demanded for union*
His pragmatlam and over-optimism in seeking conciliation,
as well as his differences with other members of the
Cabinet, are demonstrated in his response to Chatham1a
^provisional act for settling the troubles in America and
asserting the supreme legislative authority and superintending
power of Groat Britain over the c o l o n i e s * Y h l s omnibus
included the repeal of all the Coercive Acts and the Quebec
Act, as well as recognising the Congress and making other
concessions to colonial home rule, but uaequivocably stated
the supremacy of parliament*

After Its introduction in the

House of lords, Dartmouth asked for time to consider it and
suggested it lie on the table*

When he sat down, Sandwich,

one of the hostile Bedfords, denounced the Bill in the strongest
language, followed by Gower, Hillsborough and even Grafton*
fhesa members of the administration urged that the colonies

11?
were already in rebellion and must be subdued.

When one

of the opposition, speaking for the bill, commended Dartmouth
for his "candid proposal" in giving time for consideration,
Dartmouth, realising that the bill could never pass and that
he -would be taking sides against his fellow ministers in
public with nothing to be gained, reversed his position.

2b

Rising, he said that "after hearing so many noble lords speak
against permitting the bill to lie on the table," he had
changed his mind*

Typically, he declined the praise offered

for his candor, since he

*«

would now vote to reject the bill*

1.2k

As Bargar points out, "the real question was whetherto reject
the bill now or later ,

for he knew it could never be

approved, and it suited his purpose in hoping to find an
accomodation that could be approved, not to alienate the rest
of the Cabinet*

Politics, after all, is the art of the

possible.
TEE HOD AID TEE BRAICH
While Dartmouth had been concerning himself with seeking
some channel of communication, through which he might dis
cover a common ground with the Americans, others in the
ministry had been concerned with how to enforce the actions
Britain had already taken.

Gage was criticized for his

"inactivity” and because he reconmienaea repeal of the Coercive
2g
Acts.
Pownall had proposed sending Sir Jeffrey Amherst

and two major generals to America# early la the fall and
this vac considered la apita of reservations from both the
King and Dartmouth that It was harsh to Gage*

2-6

.

refusal Jettisoned the plan*'''

Amherst*a

Modest steps toward military

reinforcement had been taken but no general plan was formed#
probably because of a lack of neve from Gage and hope for
a sign of reconciliation from the First Continental Congress*
Hutchinson commented many times on the lack of direction and
27
inertia in Asterteam affairs#
and at least one minister
blamed it on Dartmoutht "What surprises me# " Rockford wrote
to Sandwich# "is that lord Dartmouth does not come with
some plan t© the Cabinet * * * X haw* been free ©nought to

pg
tell him to do it*”;
Dartmouth had a plan# but its preemption of force for
communication and conciliation did not make it popular with
the rest of the administration*

late in 1TT& Horth had

written his step-brother that he thought it right for
Dartmouth to bring "the whole of (your) measures soon before
the Cabinet* where he would "consider (your) reasons
go
dispassionately* * Exactly what these measures were is
not mentioned# but they probably included Fowaall#s commission
idee*

Apparently Berth already had reservations about them

for he then remarks on his "wish to see some measure adopted
which may prevent the bad effects which the too great appear*
29
ance of lenity and concession may produce." ^ Hot

1X9
surprisingly the Cabinet failed to adopt Dartmouth *s
suggestion and in view of his hopes for the unofficial talks
going on with Franklin, it is doubtful that he was willing
to put forward detailed military plans in its wake.
He did attempt to give effect to his new faith in the
idea of a firm hand and a velvet glove, however.

When the

new Parliament met Pownall and Knox wrote the American clause
30
in the King’s speech.
It declared that a rebellion was In
progress in Massachusetts Bay, and assured Parliament
that
You may depend upon my firm and steadfast
resolution to withstand every attempt to
weaken or Impair the supreme authority of
this legislature over all the dominions
of my crown; the maintenance of which I
consider as essential to the dignity, the
safety and the welfare of the British
Empire.
31
But it was temperate as well as firm.

As Dartmouth pointed

out to the House of Lords, it stipulated that the colonies
"would be tenderly and gently treated" when they returned to
duty.^

The Cabinet finally reached agreement in meetings

on January 13 stud January 21, upon a three-sided plan to
translate these words into action.

33

Immediate steps were taken to reinforms Gages

a number

of regiments including one of cavalry, 600 marines and 10 or
12 sloops of war were to be sent across the Atlantic.

This

continent was all that could be presently sent, but plans
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were made for more to be raised and dispatched later,

*3l|.

which

Parliament approved in mid~February.35
A further "inconvenience" conceived was the bill to
restrain the trade and fishing of the Hew England colonies.
In supporting his plan in Commons North declared "that as the
Americans had refused to trade with this kingdom, it was but
just that we should not suffer them to trade with any other
nation,” and that deprivation of the fisheries was justified
since Massachusetts was in rebellion and the other New
England colonies were aiding and abetting her treason. ^
Since the purpose of thejsaot, like that of the Port Bill, was
to compel obedienbe, the restraints were to be lifted by the
Governor upon his satisfaction that the purposes had been
3T
achieved.
Late in March official correspondence indicated
that other colonies had become equally refractory and the
trade ban was extended to all but New York, North Carolina
and Georgia.

Both bills passed with large majorities.

But while the colonies were to be brought back to duty
by force and economic pressure, the ministry, still wanted
to demonstrate its indulgence.

Hence at their January 21st

meeting they
agreed that an address be proposed to the
two Houses of Parliament to declare that
if the colonies should make sufficient and
permanent provision for the support of the
civil government and administration of
justice and for the defense and protection
of said colonies, and in time of war
contribute extraordinary supplies, in a
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reasonable proportion to what is raised
by Great Britain, we will in that ease
desist from the exercise of the power of
taxation except for commercial purposes
only, and that whenever a proposition of
this kind shall be made by any of the
colonies we will enter into the considera
tion of proper law© for that purpose, and
in the meanwhile to entreat his Majesty
to take the most effectual method© to
enforce due obedience to the law© and
authority of the supreme legislature of
Great Britain* 38
A® has been seen the view that taxation might be given up

In practice while not in principle had been held by Dartmouth
for several years, was shared by FownalX and Knox, and even
Suffolk told Hutchinson that "he owned he looked upon an
«19
attempt to enforce Internal taxation as desperate*”
While
the ministry was not willing to give up this right of taxa
tion then, they were willing to give up the exercise of it
if the colonies would solve the practical problem of finding
Yiateel&l support for themselves.

The greatest opposition

to it, a© Dartmouth told Hutchinson, was that it might
"encourage Ctbe colonlesj in their claim, of independency by
concession, of which they had always been ready to taka

advantage*

#tk0

It 1© interesting that it was not brought

into Parliament for a month after the Cabinet agreed on it
and that it followed the Bestralnt of Trade Bill and the
augmentation of military forces by nearly two weeks#
explanation© might be plausible*

Several
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First, the negotiations with Franklin did not reach
their unsuccessful conclusion until February 15 of 16 .

It

was the nineteenth when North wrote the King that the Cabinet
had decided upon the Proposition Thursday the sixteenth, and
it was presented to Parliament on the twentieth.
Secondly, north’s motives in presenting it have been
questioned.

It was widely believed that not all the colonies

were as radical as Massachusetts, though her leadership had
created a surprising unanimity.

It was thought that a

concession might disrupt this unity by causing some of the
moderate coloaies-~highest hopes were held out for New Xork-to accept the terms of the proposition and thus serve as a
damper to the fires of rebellion.

Less conciliatory was

another motive ascribed to North for bringing the motion,
as demonstrated in a letter to the King:
c o have reason to think it would give
satisfaction here and . . . that it will
greatly facilitate the passing of the
Bill now in the House for restraining the
trade of New England, and the other which
must, do fear soon be brought in for
subjecting Virginia, Maryland and other
provinces to the same restrictions. ^1
While the "indulgence" 6f his proposition may have
"facilitated" passage, it is very unlikely that North would not
have succeeded in the Restraining Act, for as the King had
written him a few days earlier:

"The concurrence of the

majority of the House of Commons In the measures to be
pursued in New England was evident in the good humour of
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receiving the motion for temporarily restraining the trade
42
and fishing at so late an hoar as six*IT
Finally, while Dartmouth clearly wanted to "hold some
thing out to the colonies," he was not entirely happy with
the Conciliatory Proposition*

I'd Etchinson "he seemed appre43
henslve of the ill-effect it might have as it now stands."
Was this because he knew how far the Proposition was from
meeting American demands, as he had seen them in Franklin*s
"Hints"?

Or because he himself was willing to go so much

further towards finding a common ground, than the others in
the Cabinet?

Or was it because he was still disappointed

that the commission idea had been dropped?
probable, if not provable,

All three are

together, Dartmouth and the

Governor agreed on alterations, some of which the Earl had
4-s

proposed in the Cabinet. ^

Dartmouth then hesitated in

regard to the dispatches which were to accompany news of the
proposition to the governors*

Hutchinson learned, albeit

third hand, that Horth had written them and had some diffi
culty in bringing Dartmouth to consent to them, although
44
he does not say why.
In the end, he supported the
Proposition as the best that could be obtained, and he held
out great hopes for it, since his other attempts at coneilid4*5
tion had failed.
His preference for personal negotiations and his laclc
of faith in the popular assemblies are demonstrated in the

private letter sent to the governors along with the dispatch
containing the proposition.

"For very obvious reasons,"

he wrote, the governor was not officially to communicate
the dispatch to the assemblies! rather he was to give "a
proper explanation of it to those whose situation and connex
ions £sic3 may enable them to give facility to the measures
„46
it points to*
In another private letter accompanying the
dispatch he wrote that:
There neither can nor will be the least
relaxation from those measures which fthe
Americans *3 conduct has made necessary
for reducing the colonies to a state of
due obedience to the constitution authority
of Parliament. 47
4
This was, he assured them "the general sense of the nation."
Dartmouth fervently hoped that once the colonists
really understood Parliament's intention to be firm and ap
preciated the good intentions behind this firmness that
they must come round to a rightful idea of the constitution
and their blessings under it.

For this reason, he was

unswayed by Governor Tryon who had written him in January
that he could not "agree with [your} Lordship's idea of
holding out the olive branch in one hand and the rod of
K7
chastisement in the other.
Tryon advised either the
removal of the stumbling blocks or rigorous measures. Dart49
mouth was against repealing the Coercive Acts
and yet
coercion had not been successful by itselfj if the colonists
feared Parliamentary intentions as they seemed to, perhaps
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some indication of its benevolence, coupled with its
determination, would help to restore harmony.

These hopes

remained alive until after the Second Continental Congress
had completely rejected the Proposition and the outbreak of
civil war illustrated the lengths to which the colonists
were willing to go to end "inconveniences” by force rather
than submission to a sovereign Parliament.

They must have

50
been fragile hopes, for Hutchinson described a very dispirited"^
Dartmouth through the winter of 1775> but they sustained
him though the disappointing news of the next months.

AH ACTIVE AHD DETERMINED PART

In November Knox had told Hutchinson that he would
welcome hostilities:
proceed."

51

"We shall then, be at no loss how to

In March, the governor had seen Dartmouth "who

seems very apprehensive that the Hew England people will
resist the King* s troops and does not know but what some
52
action between them will be best."
Perhaps Dartmouth
hoped to forcibly subdue the most refractions colonies as
a means of leading the others back to loyalty.
The American Secretary believed that the sovereignty of
Parliament must be upheld and he participated In the January
Cabinet decisions specifying that force would be used to se>
cure that end, if necessary.

Consequently, on January 27,

1775, he wrote Cage reflecting the opinion prevailing in
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the ministry that the General should take a less passive
stance?
Your dispatches . * . state proceedings
that amount to actual revolt, and shew a
determination in the people to commit
themselves at all events in open rebellion.
The King*s dignity, honor and the safety
of the Empire, require that, in such a
situation, force should be repelled by
force « . •
More troops were to be sent, the letter continued, and the
Governor-General should seek to raise additional infantry
from the loyalists.
It appears that your object has hitherto
been to act on the defensive . . . .
It
is hoped, however, that this large
reinforcement will enable you to take a
more active and determined part . . . .
There is a strong appearance that the body
of the people in at least three of the
Hew England governments are determined to
cast off their dependence upon the govern
ment of this Kingdom] the only considera
tion that remains is in what manner the
force under your command may be exerted to
defend the constitution . . . 53
Dartmouth continued to emphasise that the disobedience was
"merely the acts of a tumultuous rabble, without any appear
ance of general concert," in spite of Gage *s recent letters,
and urged him to "imprison the principal actors" in a surprise
move that would prevent bloodshed.

But commerce must be

protected from the association, even if that meant the people
would take up arms.

Finally he urged him to "recover into

the King*s possession" the military stores collected by the

12?
colonists and dismantle fortifications at Hewport and Hew
Iondon.
While such a letter obviously does not exhibit Dartmouth's
total policy towards America, and while it represents the
thinking of the Cabinet on being firm towards the rebellion,
we can safely assume that a man of Dartmouth's conscience
would not have signed it without approving of what it said.
Gage received the letter on the sixteenth of April and on
the nineteenth sent a detachment on the ill-fated mission to
Lexington and Concord.

Actually some plan of thi£ kind

had been in Gage's mind before he received the January 2?th
instructions] the dispatch simply confirmed his own anticipated
course of action.
It should, however, have prepared Dartmouth for the
May 28th arrival of a Captain Darby, employed to bring news
of the first battle as written by the Provincial Congress by
a fast ship from Salem,

This version arrived a full twelve

days before Gage's official dispatch, which only added to
the uneasiness of the whole situation.
5k
Dartmouth was "much struck with it"
affected by the account to say much." 55

and "too • . .
In hie distress

he "hinted" to Hutchinson "at the puzzle the opposition
would be In, if Administration should leave the reins to
them." 56

Despite the January dispatch, he apparently blamed

"the King's officers"

55

and perhaps his greatest disappoint

ment was that dispatches from other colonies indicated that
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news of the encounter was ruining any good effects of the
Conciliatory Proposition -which had arrived in American
57
shortly after the battle.
Typically, however, he continued
57
to have a favorable outlook
upon the proposition and at
the same time wrote Gage that the outbreak of hostilities had
"had no other effect here than to raise that just indigna
tion which every honest man must feel at the rebellious con,,58
duct of the New England colonies.
The real issue was
still Parliamentary sovereignty and Dartmouth continued
to believe it his duty to support it, even if this required
military action.

Not only must the rebellion be subdued,

but the friends of government must be protected from the
59
increasingly vicious attacks of the "patriots".
He gave
up hopes of conciliating New England:

she must be conquered.

But there was still some chance that the colonies to the
southward could be returned to duty by application of enough
force to bring the moderates to power.

He failed to

appreciate the truth in what Lieutenant-Governor Bull had
written him from South Carolina in February:

"Boston (is)

the North Star by which our political courses are shaped."

60

While he wrote Dunmore that ”the madness of the people of
Virginia . . . leaves no room for any other consideration
than that of suppressing . . . rebellion,"

and Wentworth

that "almost every . . . colony has catehed the flame and . .
,,62
a spirit of rebellion has gone forth;
he wrote Campbell
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that "there is still some room to hope that the colonies to
the Southward may not proceed to the same lengths as those
,,63
of New England*
In these separate letters he advised each
governor that "the proper measures are now pursuing , . .
for augmenting the Army and (adding} to our naval strength.
To Dunmore and Martin however, he sent an additional note
urging them to encourage association in the western counties
of North Carolina against the rebels, and the raising of a
loyalist battalion of Highlanders. 65

.
Something of Knox's

belief

that once the Americans had tasted what therebels

had to

offer they would gladly accept the supervision of

Parliament shows in his letter to Dunmore:
Support of Council on May 2 . . . affords
good ground to hope, that men of spirit
and property will at l&ngth be awakened
to a sense of their situation and the
inevitable ruin which must follow from such
a state of total anarchy and confusion as
your Lordship represents the colony to be
in. 65
If Dartmouth still had hopes of reconciliation, the rest
of the Cabinet was more concerned with the pursuit of
"vigorous measures."

In a conversation with Hutchinson,

Hillsborough claimed that "Lord Suffolk, Lord Rochford,
Gower, Sandwich, and the Chancellor, with Lord North, were
all of one mind . . . that Lord Dartmouth was alone." 66

This

cryptic comment apparently puzzled Hutchinson, for he added,
after writing it in his diary, "perhaps he meant, not equally
66
engaged."
Certainly Dartmouth did not oppose the military
steps he described as necessary and Just in his letters to
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the governors, if he did still hope for a short and narrow
span of hostilities.

The cabinet met on June 15 and 21 to

plan the increase in forces froip Great Britain, Ireland and
Canada, with regiments from Gibraltar and Minorca to join those
raised from Scotland in America.^

And clearly, if, as

Pownall put it, the Cabinet had to choose between "leaving
the colonies independent or acting more vigorously in
reducing them to government,"

68

Dartmouth's preference would

have been the same as his colleagues.
The King, as seen above, was of a similar mind.
was undisturbed by even Captain
Lexington

He

Darby's partial account of

and Concord as he had expected "blows" todecide

the question of independence or submission for some time.

69

He played an active part in making plans to augment army
TO
and naval forces in the colonies.
His determination was
revealed in a letter to North:
I am clear as to one point, that we must
persist and not be dismayed by any
difficulties that may arise on either
side of the Atlantic; I know I am doing
my duty and therefore can never wish to
retract. 71
Even with the outbreak of war, however, there was
optimism.

As North expressed it,
Our wish is not to impose on our fellow
subjects in America any terms inconsistent
with the most perfect liberty. I cannot
help thinking that many of the principal
persons in North America will, in the
calmness of the winter, be disposed to bring

131
forward a reconciliation,
Now they are
too angry, too suspicious, too much under
the guidance of factious leaders • • • J2
Dartmouth was similarly inclined to look on the bright side
at

thispoint.

He wrote to Knox who

was at Spa, a letter

touching in its warmth and futile hope:
Your confident ce) of success has sometimes
kept up my spirits when they were beginning
to einkj let me now prevail upon you to
believe that all will yet do well, notwith
standing the gloom that covers the horizon.
The fate of empires often depends upon
events that are little foreseen until the
moment of their appearance. 73
With no real evidence of a happy ending, the American
Secretary was forced to look to what had not yet occurred
for a solution.

He was still in this mood a month later

when he wrote to Knox from Sandwell, that
I rather wish than expect a settlement of
our differences upon the ground of the terms
stated in the article from Philadelphia.
However, I see no reason why we may not now
set our feet upon that or any ground that
can be given and though both sides will have
a great way to go before they will be within
the sound of each others voice, it is not
impossible that they may come near enough
to shake hands at last.” 7 ^
Dartmouth put his own

terms at the end of the letter:

Parliament would regulate trade and the colonies would provide
"revenue for the support of civil government, and such
military force as they . . . desire."

It ie on these terras

of the Conciliatory Proposition that Dartmouth still hoped
for agreement!

"God send that day as soon as it may be,"

he finished, but thisprayer could
Americans would never

not be answered,

again settle for those terms.

for the

132

OUT OF THE SOUHD OF EACH OTHER *S VOICES

The spring and summer of 1775 witnessed more than the
outbreak of civil war and extensive military preparations
on both sides of the Atlantic#

The Americans mad© two last

attempts at conciliating their differences with the mother
country; their failure represents just how far apart the two
parties to the dispute were, and the end of any moderate
Influences in the colonies#
As noted above, Hew York had long been regarded as the
most loyal of colonies.

There are more items relating to

Hew York remaining in Dartmouth* s papers (as calendared by
the Historical Manuscripts Commission) than any other colony
except the problem child of Massachusetts, doubtless for
this reason.

lew York had no official delegation at the

First Continental Congress and the Hew York Assembly
“disapproved and rejected*' the measures of that body “in one
„T5
grand blow*
The Restraining Act was not applied to Hew
York, and more than any other colony It was expected that
Hew York would accept the Conciliatory Proposition.

But the

Idleness of such expectations became apparent when the King
received a conciliatory petition from the Assembly stating
the necessity for “such a system of government . . .

as will

ascertain and limit the authority of the British legislature.11^
Obviously with the King determined to support the sovereignty
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of Parliament as the essence of the constitution which
brought peace and harmony to the Empire, such a petition
to,

not acceptable*

Both houses of Parliament likewise

declined even to hear the petitions addressed to them read,
on the grounds that they denied the right of Parliament to
tax the colonies in all cases whatsoever.

As Bargar points

out, it was '"unreal!stic for the two house© of Parliament * .
to stand on their dignity . * * when the supremacy they
claimed was rapidly vanishing in a revolutionary war*"^7
Yet they were unable to see any alternative.

Conformable

to hie desire to open channels of communication, Dartmouth
favored receiving the remonstrance, though he could not
agree to it, and North was "rather inclined;" but they were
78

alone in this preference.

The Secretary*© own lack of

realism is evident in his letter to Tryon explaining the re
jection of the petitions, for he expressed confidence "that
the resolution of the House of Commons of the 27th Febfruarjy
will remove all obstacles to the restoration of public
.*79
tranquillity* ^ Surely this can only be described as
grasping at straws; Dartmouth must have reallad how far even
Hew York was from accepting the Conciliatory Proposition when
he read their Remonstrances.

This is especially true since

Dartmouth had been Informed by the time he wrote his letter
of New York*© progress toward© the same extra-legal actions
her northern brethren were taking*

13k
•1?
If American moderates vere disheartened by the reception, or
lack of it, of New York’s gesture, they vere totally dis
illusioned toy the treatment accorded the Olive Branch
petition to the King of the Second Continental Congress.
Dartmouth, as seen in his letter to Knox above, had hopes for
this petition and took pains to ensure that a proclamation,
putting into effect a resolution of the House of Commons
declaring some of the colonies in a state of rebellion, vas
8l
postponed until after lie delivery.
These efforts vere
only partially successful, since an unofficial copy of the
petition reached the American office before the Privy Council
approved the Proclamation on August 2k, 1?75> hut Dartmouth
did not receive it in person until September 1.
Bargar speculates on Dartmouth’s state of mind as he
received Richard Penn and Arthur Lee, special delegates from
the Congress, vith their petition.
had mixed feelings.

Certainly he must have

On the one hand David Barclay had told

him that this vae a sincere attempt at reconcillation, the
rejection of which would completely undermine the position
82
of moderates in America.
On the other was the urgent belief
of another old friend that to treat "with rebels, while they
have arms in their hands,” would demonstrate a fatal
83
weakness. J

In the end Dartmouth’s action was probably

dictated by his own conception of what the petition said.
After accepting the petition Dartmouth shoved it to the
King and then declined to make any comment on it saying
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"that as hie Majesty did not receive It on the throne,
m
no answer would he given. **
Dartmouth took this approach
■since it was apparent to hi® that no accomodation could
he reached on the basis of the petitloot

the colonists in

addressing themselves to the crown above Parliament were,
In effect, repealing the Glorious Revolution.

When a motion

was made in the House of Lords the following November that
the petition afforded ground© for reconciliation, Dartmouth
defended its rejection#

To accept it, the product of

Congress, would be to reliatulsh the sovereignty of Parlia*
meat.

Furthermore, some of John Adams* intercepted letters

had convinced the ministry that independence wa© the real
aim of the Americans} hence Dartmouth claimed that, "the
petition, in terms, was unexceptionable, but there was
rea&m to believe that the softness of language was purposely
.,85
adopted to conceal the most traitorous designs#”
Dartmouth was a moderate} the petition had been framed
by American moderatesi

and yet eo far as had the two sides

to the dispute travelled by the fall of 1775, that even the
moderate© were out of the sound of each others* voices.
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CHAPTER VI
A RELEASE FROM FATIGUE

fO ESTABLISH AH IHDEPBHDENCX

The year 1775 'was a disillusioning one for Dartmouth.
In February he had written Gage that
I am convinced that whilst Great Britain
continues firm, tempering at the same
time her firmness with such indulgence to
Any reasonable proposition that shall be
offered by the colonies in respect to
taxation,as shall consist with justice to
them and a resolute attachment to the
principles of the Constitution anarfcy,
confusion & disobedience must give way to
peace and good government. 1
In July he could ’’still entertain a hope . . . that when
the middle colonies have recovered from the prejudices . . .
created by . « * artful misrepresentations of the affair of
, . * the 19th of April, they will be induced to take up
the # * . Resolution of the 20th of Febr{[uar)y . . .

11

There was loss of faith behind this hope, however, as Dartmouth
revealed in the next paragraph:
At the same time we must not trust tb
appearances . . . the conduct of the people
of Connecticut, who, in the moment of their
preparing for an expedition against
Ticonderoga had the affectation to propose
to you a suspension of hostilities, is an
instance of such consummate duplicity, as
ought to put us very much on our guard against
such proposals# 2
ll»3

ikk

Dartmouth was becoming discouraged, and the dispatches
from America only added to his pessimism by demonstrating
the total failure of his policies,

Lieutenant Governor Bull

wrote that the conciliatory proposition "seems rather to
alarm them and to raise their jealousies

than to in. * Invite

them to a separate application, and will , , . strengthen
their unanimity,"

If indulgence had not been effective,

neither had firmness, for Wentworth advised him that "diffi
culties increase here every day, more especially sinee the
Hestaining Bill took place,

There was no longer any doubt,

Campbell wrote, that the rebels were planning "to establish
an independency,”5 and "scarce a shadow of authority (wasj
left" to government,

6

Gage informed him that nearly every

colony had "overthrown its government and . . , lodged , , .
all power in Congress and committees,”

Perhaps most dis

turbing to the Secretary was the termination of that
affection and reverence for the mother country that Reed had
8
spoken glowingly of as late as February.
As Wentworth
described iti
In that early stage of the opposition ♦ , .
the people condemned the insult and attack
on his Majesty1s fort and violation of his
property, which now, that violence hath
got such a head as to bring on a civil war,
they applaud and commend as highly meri
torious, 9
If the lari's official correspondence was disconcerting,
the intercepted private letters that came to his attention
were even more so.

Here he learned that "a motion has been

1*5
made at the Continental Congress for an independency,,,i0
and that if England "thought Congress would Insist on nothing
but no taxation" they were solely mistaken.
so since blood (had been] spilled."

This was “not

The writer, in this

ease none other than Thomas Jefferson, continued:
I wish no false sense of honor, no ignorance
of our real intentions, no vain hope that
partial concessions of right will be accepted
may induce the ministry to trifle with
accommodation til it shall be put even out
of our own power ever to accommodate. 11
By the end of the summer of 1775 it was clear from all
accounts that civil government in America had been almost
totally usurped, most governors having had to flee to the
safety of naval vessels or British forts, and that civil
war was being vigorously waged by both sides.

12

Moreover,

colonial demands had risen beyond the possibility of ful
fillment by the ministry then in power, including the good
Lord Dartmouth.
The only option for the ministry, given its interpre
tation of the constitution, was to militarily reduce the
colonies to submission.

The Proclamation of Rebellion

issued August 2* gave notice to America and the world that
this was exactly what Britain intended to do.
colonial

While the

Secretary was more willing to temporize with

America than the King and the rest of the cabinet, he too,
was unwilling to accept the alternative to war;

a dimunition

in Parliaments ability to supervise the colonies.

~

Ik6
Like hi© colleague© mud all Englishmen, he was unable to
perceive the impracticability of insisting on the maintenance
of a right that no longer existed.

The Conciliatory Propo*

sltioa had been vehemently rejected* not only by each indivi~
dual colony, but by the Second Continental Congress*

Yet

la it© address to the King* tie House of Common© reiterated
the same plan.

"When the colonise ©hall have made sufficient

provision for the support of their respective civil
governments * # . %

they---advised, it would no longer be

necessary for Parliament to raise a revenue in America.

But

Parliament could *fnever so far desert the trust reposed in
them a© to relinquish any part of the sovereign authority
over all his Majesty*© dominions* nor allow that any of
them ought to be exempted from the common burden necessary
to the Whole."12
The administration* accordingly, had thrown itself
wholeheartedly into preparation for carrying out its military
p o l i c y * The only ray of light for Dartmouth at this

point was the loyalty of the western counties of Morth
Carolina of which Martin had written so confidently!
consequently hie major contribution to the war effort© in
the making was to insure that an expedition to the southern
colonies would be dispatched before winter.

Even this hope

wae dim* however, for he wrote Martini
In such a situation I must confess to you
that 1 think you are too ©anguine in your

Ib7

expectation of being able, if properly
supported, in the manner you suggest, to
induce a large part of the inhabitants
of North Carolina to take up arms in
support of Government, l^f
Arms, and later an expedition were sent, the dispatches
concerning them being the last Dartmouth wrote before leaving
office.15
This sort of business however, was not at all to Dart
mouth 1s liking.

It was normal for him to spend several

weeks la Staffordehire in August and early September, but in
1775 his absence continued until much later in to the fall*
While he returned to town for brief periods, he left the
disagreeable direction of military matters to Pownall.

16

Naturally with the Secretary absent some^of the old quarrels
over the status of the American department flared open and
Pownall wrote exaggeratedly to Knox that,
As to measures for America, I know
nothing about them, for since I have
been deserted by our principal, that
business is got into other hands and
my friend Eden knows a great deal
more . . , than your faithful servant.17
Perhaps such friction was part of Dartmouth*© determination
to stay away but unpleasantness did not emanate from the
Northern Department alone.

Secretary at War Barrington wrote

Dartmouth to disagree with his plans for supporting Martin
and Campbell and rather petulantly reminded him "of the
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necessity for consulting able military men before taking
„l8
Steps in military matters.
While such criticism increased the onerousness of
Dartmouth's already unpalatable employment, he could not
resign for two reasons.

First, he was in substantial agree-

ment with the cabinet’s policy even if he disliked imple
menting it.

Secondly, he remained, as in 1712, North's only

ally in an otherwise hostile cabinet.

To desert his step

brother in a time of crisis would leave him politically
vulnerable, especially in view of the defection of another
member of the administration, the Duke of Grafton.

AH HOBOBABLE BETBEAT

It was Grafton’s defection, however, that ultimately
provided for Dartmouth’s escape and bolstered Worth’s
position by appeasing the Bedfords and Suffolk with the
addition of lord George Germain to the cabinet.
The Duke of Grafton, Lord Privy Seal, had fallen out
with Horth’e ministry over its refusal to repeal the tea
duty, and had not attended a cabinet meeting since 17?0 »
The Olive Branch precipitated his final breaks he wrote the
Prime Minister of his plan for Parliament to receive the
petition and ask the King to offer suspension of hostilities
If the colonies would depute persons to England to negotiate

with the mother country*

19

Grafton waited seven weeks before
20
north replied in the negativej
by this- time Parliament was
in session and the Privy Seal was speaking out in Lords against

his own administration*

Suspicions that he would not he

part of that administration for long were widespread, as were
rumors of what would become of his office*

"They talk of

Lord Dartmouth for the Privy Seal if the Duke of Grafton
goes out , « * hut it is a moot question If Orafton will he * .
without a salary*"^

Perhaps it was his reputed avarice

that made Orafton delay hi© resignation in

spite of the

embarrassment he caused the ministry! finally, the King wrote
lorth that his Seale would be sent for if he did not bring
them himself*
Dartmouth too, knew of Grafton*a impending retirement,
and asked to have Grafton*® office when he left it*

As

Grafton*s successor had been apparent to those observing
British politics in 1775, so was Dartmouth*ss
Lord George Germain is talked of to succeed
Lord Dartmouth who is to be Privy Seal*
1 wish the talk may be confirmed, because
our friend Lord Dartmouth will have repose,
and an honorable retreat, & Lord George
Germain will have a very distinguished com**
plement to his abilities, and both will
be well provided for, & I should think to
both their satisfactions. 23
Lord George Germain presents a great contrast to the
pious Lord Dartmouth**

Politically, Germain had been a

Grenvillite when Dartmouth was serving at the Board of Trade
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in Boekingham*s ministry, and later supported the Towoshend
2b
Duties and vigorous measures to enforce them*
The contrast

was also personal.

Germain was typically military*'

aggressive, vehement, dogmatlc***and an adroit politician
25
as well#
His career had supposedly been eclipsed in
the late fifties by a eourt~msrtial for cowardice after
which he was designated as unfit ever to serve his Majesty
again, and yet he bad worked his way back into royal and
ministerial graces in ©lightly more than ten years.

He had

spoken energetically and often la favor of the Coercive
Acts in Common© and made a favorable impression on Lord
Borth who was in need of oratorical support in that house*

26

An 1TT5 brought the outbreak of hostilities he played a

larger role in the thinking of the ministry; Suffolk, in
particular, wrote to him on American affairs and obtained
his ideas on political and military matters*

Suffolk1®

Dndersecretary Idea sent him frequent and detailed letters
27
to keep him informed.
In early October of 17T5 he wrote
**at the special request of Lord north,1* outlining plans
and including a draft of the King* s speech and saying, ”1
shall proceed to tell yon without form or flattery that Lord
2$
Horth * * * thinks you the fittest man in the kingdom.**
So Germain was being consulted on matters within
Dartmouth*© authority weeks before Dartmouth went out of
office#

That he had little use for the amiable Earl is

evident from a letter shown Hutchinson in which Germain said
that the ministry would not fall after Lexington and Concord
,29
though "Lord Dartmouth, in a fright, may go out* '
He
thought it improbable that Dartmouth would "give the necessary
30
orders for decisive and vigorous measures."
Such a persona
lity and^such political ideas could not fall to be appealing
31
to the King,
determined as he was to cn^i the rebellion)
and Horth would have been eager to have had an able advocate
in Commons during a session when he feared a strong attach
on government*
Dartmouth, who had never wanted to enter office in the
first place, was discouraged by the events of late 1775 and
eager for a refuge consonant with his own integrity and the
honor of Lord Horth.

He was willing to lose j£2000 annually
33
in salary in order to change his office.
But while his
quest of the Privy Seal was self-initiated, it was not

unwelcome to the King and cabinet.
It is an over-simplification to see Dartmouth's exit
and Germain's entrance as a change of policy on the p a r t of
the ministry) Dartmouth believed the waging of war against
the rebellion was necessary, as his speeches in the House
of Lords after he became Privy Seal demonstrate.

In November,

1775, he defended rejection of the Olive Branch, and in
March, 1776, he opposed Grafton's conciliation proposal at
length, declaring that the only remedy to the current diffl3^
culties was an overpowering force.
There was, however,
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a difference in the two men and Germain's accession does
signify a change in tone at least.

He reversed several of

Dartmouth's military policies immediately.^

The contrast

between the two is further seen in their approach to the
Peace Commission of 1776 in which Germain demanded a recog
nition of Parliamentary supremacy as a sine qua none for
the negotiations, which Dartmouth opposed from sure Knowledge
that such a stipulation would doom the talks before they got
steated,

The then Privy Seal felt strongly enough about

this to threaten resignation, as did Germain, until a com
promise was worked out.
Some of the confusion over the meaning of this change
of office can be traced to quite uncharacteristic behavior
on the part of the Earl of Dartmouth,

Though all seemed

to desire the changes, there was a fly in the ointment:
Lord Weymouth, who had not only a prior claim to the office
Grafton was vacating but some powerful friends in the Duke
of Bedford and his followers in the cabinet, Sandwich and
Gower.

In spite of this claim, Dartmouth refused to accept

any other office than the Privy Seal,

The King at first

urged him to become Groom of the Stole, which was an honorary
post, but, Dartmouth apparently felt, did not carry enough
weight for him adequately to support North.

Later North

arranged for Rochford to retire that his step brother might
have the Southern Department, but this office carried too
much of the business from which Dartmouth desired to escape.
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As he wrote John Bob inarms

"If I take the Seals that are

offered me X shall reader myself tea. times more miserahle
than X a m * T h e

anguish of his situation Is quite appa-

rents
The dread of a situation in which 1 see
no satisfaction to myself on one hand*
and ay love for lord Horth and regard to
his peace of mind on the other tear me
to pieces* 1 would with all my heart go
quite out of employment, hut that would
look unkind to him * * * 11 36
lord Horth threatened to

resign if Dartmouth did and his

situation was rendered even more embarrassing since he had
ventured to negotiate with Germain about the American
Department before Dartmouth reefgnedj when Dartmouth was
told the Privy Seal was unavailable he ©aid he would remain
in his present position.

Clearly Iforth had to find a place

to his step brother*© liking in order to extricate himself
from hie predicament, which was further complicated by
Weymouth*© threat to resign if he did not get the Privy Seal,
which as the king ©aid, would certainly make
happy.

Horth thought he

hie friends un

had come up with an excellent solu*

tion when he wrote the King asking him to provide a j£2500
pension for Lord Bochford who was fortunately In ill health,
which would open up one of the older secretaryships for
either Weymouth or Dartmouth.

31

The king, piqued at Dartmouth

for not Mpermit(ting) his amiable temper to examine the
38
state of affaire coolly”
and end the crisis, agreed to the:

pension plan "though my finances are in a very disgraceful
s i t u a t i o n . S i n c e Dartmouth would not accept the
Secretary*s Seals, Weymouth was finally persuaded to do so
and the way was at last cleared for Dartmouth to become
Lord Privy Seal and Germain to become American Secretary.
The Seals of each were received on November 10, 1775•
November 28, Hutchinson visited Dartmouth,

On

f,who I found

reading my History and more cheerful than at any time of late,

CONCLUSIONS

Dartmouth*s role in the unhappy events leading up to
the loss of the first British Empire has been obscured and
distorted by partisan and superficial descriptions of secon
dary authors.

As a former "old Whig" he is treated favorably

by George Otto Trevelyans

"if Dartmouth could have ruled

the colonies according to the dictates of his own judgment
and conscience « , . independence would have been postponed
hi
until he ceased to be secretary of state,"
When he is
not praised for differing with the rest of North's ministry,
he is damned for being too weals: to overcome their dlslifce
of his policies.

Benjamin Labaree, somewhat more sympathetic

than others, nevertheless believed "a more determined statesk2
man could have succeeded."
Ritcheson calls him amiable,
pious and commonplace" and says his colleagues treated him
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"aB a veil-meaning non-entity and sought to engross American
business all they could# 1*^3

Lewis Einstein claims that he

was regarded as "boringly over-sanctimonious*’ and ascribes
his failure to "the cynical political atmosphere of that
age#like

Labaree, Fothergill’s biographer, H. H* Fox,

faults the Earl for having "no firmness of character."
John Alden dwells not on his weakness, but criticizes his
attempts at conciliation as " h a l f - h e a r t e d . W h e n Dartmouth’s
attachment to the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty is
adequately appreciated, he is held to account for not having
developed the concept of dominion status to satisfy home
rule and the imperial superiority of the mother country, a
concept that was not feasible for several more decades and until
numerous changes in the internal constitution of Great Britain
had taken place#
Part of the difficulty these authors faced can be traced
to their sources#

There are conflicting pictures drawn of

Dartmouth, as of any figure in a place of public importance
by hie contemporaries.

During the debate on the Coercive

Acts, Attorney-General Thurlou claimed that the ministry was
pursuing coercion with
Lord Dartmouth, who was then American
Secretary, taking the lead, to exeulpatb
himself for having formerly moved the
repeal of the Stamp Act in the Lords. 48
William Lee1s description of the American Secretary *s motives
during this debate is quite different?
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Lord North, Dartmouth and, some say, Lord
Mansfield, have been against these measures;
but the Jc£ing3 with his usual obstinacy and
tyrfanaica^l disposition, is determined . . .
to enslave you; the Bedford Party, Lord
Temple and the remnant of the Grenville Party,
Lords Suffolk and Wedderburn, wished the same
as well as to make their court to the King,
so that Lords North and Dartmouth have been
overruled in the Cabinet*" kj
This was the same Mansfield Pownall blamed for the Massachu
setts Government Act.

The Americans could not even agree

amongst themselves as to how to assess Dartmouth.

While

Benjamin Franklin wrote, "He is truly a good man and wishes
sincerely a good understanding with the colonies, but does
not seem to have strength equal to his w i s h e s , A r t h u r
Lee sneered "I am apt to think he will not attempt any thing
50

in our favor that will hazard his place.’1

Many of these primary accounts can be disregarded as
obviously prejudiced; others present a more difficult
interpretive problem.

Shelburne wrote Chatham, again during

the debates on the Coercive Acts;
I accidentally met Lord Dartmouth
yesterday . * . without entering into
the particular measures in question,
he stated with great fairness, and with
very little reserve, the difficulties
of his situation, the unalterableness
of his principles, and his determination
to cover America from the present storm,
even to repealing the Tea Act. 51
At first glance,

I this letter seems to indicate that

Dartmouth was opposed to the steps in process by the ministry
and most authors who have quoted Shelburne have stressed
(T2
the "to cover America.’’
^
part of a very full sentence. It

15?
is as important to notice his attachment to his political
principles, which are well-known to us from his letters
to Reed and Cushing.

These principles called for coercion,

hence my reading that Dartmouth’s was a pragmatic approach.
Bradley Bargar *s book length study naturally does more
Justice to the complexities of Dartmouth's role as American
Secretary than the dime store analysis of a generalized
narrative.

He rightly points out that Dartmouth's reputa

tion as a friend to America was inflated; the subsequent
deflation of the bubble of optimism after his acceptance of
the Secretary’s Seals is doubtless what originated much of
the misunderstanding about him.

Bargar emphasizes the Earl’s

belief in Parliamentary sovereignty, his natural kindliness
and.piety and his naivete in expecting his policies to be
effective.

He comprehends the obstacles Dartmouth faced in

trying to effect conciliation from an office that was not
designed to plan policy and in a Cabinet where he could not
create turmoil for fear of undermining his step brother's
position.
On the other hand there are some distinctions the present
study makes.

Bargar does not present Dartmouth’s desire

for negotiation, especially through a commission, as forcefully
as I believe Dartmouth felt it.

He makes what was sometimes

careful diplomacy on the Secretary’s part an act of mere
courtesy.

The consistency of Dartmouth's support of coercive
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and conciliatory policies simultaneously is not fully demon
strated.

Finally, Dartmouth is criticized for favoring the

information in his official dispatches over that from perhaps
less biassed sources, such as Reed.

But no one in Georgian

England could have been freed from their misconceptions of
the situation.

Franklin and Hutchinson demonstrate the

universality of this failing, as Franklin confidently wrote
to America many times that the ministry must surely fall and
that unanimity would produce results; Hutchinson just as
confidently told the ministry that the colonists would never
unite.
Dartmouth believed Parliament sovereign but he believed
that its sovereignty could be maintained in name only,
without a tax to demonstrate it.

This sovereignty could even

be denied by Americans, as long as it was a denial in words
and

not in deeds.

Once the latter occurred he maintained

that the denial must be revoked or the colonies would be
come independent, an evil second only to the derogation of
Parliamentary authority.

At the same time he realized that

extreme measures would only create extreme responses.

Bo

while he adhered to a policy of coercing Massachusetts into
obeying the laws of Parliament, he hoped not to offend her
in the process.

He was not totally successful nor was he

completely unsuccessful in influencing the Cabinet along
these lines.

In any event he did not oppose the measures
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ultimately adopted.

As a moderate, he sought to bring the

two extremes together through the give and take of negotia
tion, thus his abortive efforts with Franklin and towards
obtaining commissioners to treat with America.
were farther apart than he thought:

The extremes

Franklin's unyielding

demands were as unacceptable as the unyielding force
advocated by the Bedfords.

As a pragmatist, he got each to

make what concessions they would, and over-optimistically
hoped for the beat.

In the end, the constitutional diver

gence was too great to be negotiated, and too great even to
be suffered to continue in silence until time and progress
could produce a peaceful solution.
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BXBL'X00BAPHICA& NOTES

The sources used in this study, for reasons pecuher
to the topic, are barely adequate to support its conclu
sions*

In trying to get at what the Bari of Dartmouth

thought about the events of hi© term of office X used a
threefold approach.
First, X consulted his official correspondence with
the governors, manuscripts from the Public Record Office
on microfilm.

All the colonies were not available, though

the sampling was fairly good; those used were South
Carolina, .North Carolina, Virginia, New York, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and one group that was simply
circular letters from Whitehall*

The letters to Dartmouth

do give their reader an insight into what he knew, with
the advantage of guessing what his reaction would he
(although one can*t be certain he read all of them, at
least he read most)*

The main difficulty with this source,

as noted above, is that letters from Dartmouth reflect the
decisions of the cabinet and the phraseology of the under
secretary, especially those dated at times he was usually
in the country*

Carter*e The Correspondence of General Gage,

fits in this category, as does The Correspondence of Joseph
Reed.

The latter is distinguished, however, by the in

clusion of a letter from Dartmouth to Reed which was almost
certainly written by h|m since it is of a private nature-
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165
and was most useful in determining hit real feelings*
The second attempt to probe Dartmouth1® mind was through,
a study of the Historical Manuscripts Commission calendar
of the Earl*a paper®.

Unfortunately, a calendar leaves

much to be deaired since most of the letters are abstracted
and described and those that are actual quotations from the
original are cut and some of the context is missing-.
discouraging to read something likes

"Tells of news from

America and gives opinions on what should be done*"
newetl

What opinions?*

ble information here.

How

What

Nevertheless, there was some valua
A final regret is that Dartmouth

must not have kept a letterbook for there were few of his
personal letters.
The third approach, and in some ways the most fruitful,
was to read what his contemporaries had to say about him*
Hutchinson1# diary, Franklin’s letters, and the correspon
dence of 0#orge III, were the most revealing as each had
extensive contact with Dartmouth and frequently recorded
their conversation© with him*

Kn&x*n papers, calendared by

the Historical Manuscripts Commission were also of some
help*

Obviously the defect with such sources is the preju*

dice of the reporter; the point of view of each influenced
the light in which they saw the American Secretary.
Since a trip to the William Salt Library and a perusal
of what remains of Dartmouth’s papers was out of the
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question, and ©inoe my primary soureas were not Ideal* I
relied on several secondary worfc© whose authors had seen
the Dartmouth manuscripts*

In particular these were Bradley

Bargar*© Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution, Margaret
Specter1© ffhe American Department of the British Government
1766-178%» and Benjamin Babaree*© The. Bo aton fee Party,
Although my conclusions on Dartmouth differ ©lightly from
hie I am most heavily Indebted to Bargar, especially for
confirmation of the suspicion that Dartmouth was not as proAmerican a© the Americans thought, which became the feulwarh
of my thesis.
Other secondary vorfc© influenced my understanding of
Dartmouth*s milieu, especially Blchard Bree* Qeorge IXX and
the BollticIans4

My own limited experience with primary

material© verified the analyse© of the author© I used.
One final notes

in view of the fact that I have quoted

from so many different primary and manuscript sources, I
have modernised all capitalisation and punctuation in order
to aahe the thesis consistent.

While this detracts con

siderably from the color of elghteenth-eeatury language it
unclutter© a twentieth-century essay,

BiB&xoaiyypM*
36AHCSCRXPT8 (Public Record Office Microfilm la the personal
library of Ira Camber)
Colonial Office 5/396 South Carolina
c* 0« 5/1353 Virginia

c.

0* 5/1007 lew fork

c« 0.
c.

0.

5/1008 Hew fork
5/765 Maseachusetts, from Dartmouth

c. 0#

5/?69 Massachusetts, from the Covernor

c< 0.

$/$k6 Hew Hampshire, from the Covernor

e*

0.

c.

0* 5/993 Hew Jersey

5/9**t Raw Hampshire, from Dartmouth

o. 0. $/2k2 circular Letters
c. 0. 5/318 North Carolina
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